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A TALE OF TWO LIABILITIES
CARTER G. BISHOPt
We should be careful to get out of an experience only the
wisdom that is in it-and stop there; lest we be like the cat
that sits down on a hot stove lid. She will never sit down on
a hot stove lid again-and that is well; but also she will
never sit down on a cold one any more.
-Mark Twain.
In two recent cases,' the Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of
Appeal conflicted substantively over the impact of Internal
Revenue Code section 357(c) 2 on shareholder notes and con-
tinuing guarantees of liabilities "transferred" to a corporation
where the liabilities exceed the basis of the assets transferred.
This article reviews the judicial as well as the legislative history
of section 357(c). It concludes that legislative action is neces-
sary to allow the tax law to properly reflect the true economic
reality of such transfers to shareholders as well as their
corporations.
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1. Lessinger v. Commissioner, 872 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1989) and Owen v. Com-
missioner, 881 F.2d 832 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 58 U.S.L.W. 3526 (U.S. Feb. 20,
1990). The author accepted a pro bono referral of Owen through the William Mitchell
College of Law legal tax clinic. On November 2, 1989, a Petition for a Writ of Certio-
rari to the United States Supreme Court was filed with regard to the section 357(c)
issue in the Owen case.
2. I.R.C. § 357(c) (1986). Statutory references are to the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986 unless otherwise indicated.
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INTRODUCTION
It would be interesting to know whether Mr. Twain had a tax
lawyer in mind. As tax practice becomes increasingly complex,
practice errors become more commonplace. 3 Some practice
errors result in attorney discipline while still others result in
malpractice claims.
4
3. In a lawyer's career in Minnesota, chances are about one in ten of having an
ethical complaint filed against him with the Minnesota Board of Lawyer's Profes-
sional Responsibility and about one in three of being named in a malpractice action.
J. Geis, Remarks at the Minnesota 49th Annual Tax Institute: Tax Practice Versus
Malpractice (November 10, 1989).
4. The relationship between ethical standards of tax practice as expressed in
ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 314 (1965); ABA Comm. on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 335 (1974), 346 (1982), and 352 (1985),
and as reflected in the MINNESOTA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1988), and the
standards governing malpractice in providing tax advice is not clearly defined. The
Preamble to the Minnesota Rules states that the rules are not intended to form the
basis of legal malpractice claims but are rather designed to be prescriptive of lawyer
[Vol. 16
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The body of tax law has become complex because of inher-
ent statutory intricacies, frequency and volume of legislative
enactments, and subsequent judicial and administrative inter-
pretations. Yet despite the complexity of this area of practice,
lawyer practice standards remain high. 5 This article tells the
conduct in general. Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine that a plaintiff's expert
witness testimony would not include a reference to the Minnesota Rules (presuming
a violation has been established) as evidence of a breach of a standard of care.
As with any tort claim, a malpractice violation is premised upon the existence of
(i) a duty (inferred from the lawyer-client relationship), (ii) a breach of that duty (rea-
sonable conduct standard increasingly interpreted as the standard of practice for na-
tional tax specialists), and (iii) damage causally connected to the lawyer's negligent
advice or conduct.
The issue of damages in the field of tax practice is not always easy to establish.
In many cases where the tax liability was under reported, the taxpayer will simply
have to pay the tax liability that would have accrued from a properly reported trans-
action. If this is an increase over the amount originally paid, the taxpayer may not be
able to establish damage since they are simply paying what the transaction correctly
required in the first place. Interest on the deficiency may also not be an element of
damage since the taxpayer has, in fact, had the use of the deficiency amount in the
interim and will have a deduction for the interest expense paid to the government.
See I.R.C. § 163(h) for the conditions of deductibility.
Incorrect advice may cause real damage to a taxpayer where a transaction which
could have been more favorably reported results in a deficiency related to an over-
payment. The damage results where the option for correction and refund has been
precluded by either the time or manner of the original reporting. Yet even in these
cases, the taxpayer's loss will be compensated by an increase in basis in some asset as
a result of paying more tax than was necessary. Thus the damage may be nothing
more than a measure of the time value of money determined by the estimated nature
of the recovery of the increased basis.
There may, however, be some circumstances involving personal as opposed to
business transactions where the additional basis may not compensate the taxpayer
because it will never be recovered. See, e.g., Clark v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 333
(1939) (the practitioner advised an election resulting in a less advantageous filing
status which resulted in the taxpayer overpaying the tax liability). For a general dis-
cussion of the relationship between ethical standards and nontax malpractice claims
see Hoover, The Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Lawyer Malpractice Actions: The
Gap Between Code and Common Law Narrows, 22 NEW ENG. L. REV. 595 (1988).
On the other hand, violations and sanctions under the rules governing profes-
sional conduct and therefore licensing standards do not require damage to the client.
The prescriptive nature of the rules are designed to influence prospective lawyer
conduct regardless of monetary client damage. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n.,
436 U.S. 447, 466 (1978).
5. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 314 (1965); ABA Comm.
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 335 (1974), 346 (1982), and
352 (1985) (detailing applicable legal and ethical standards in rendering tax advice in
normative tax situations as well as tax shelters). These rules are based upon interpre-
tations of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and its attendant Discipli-
nary Rules. In 1985, Minnesota adopted its own version of the Model Rules of
Professional Responsibility and repealed the Model Code of Professional Responsi-
bility. Nevertheless, the ABA opinions remain the prevailing standard of profes-
1990]
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story of a common business transaction in which the potential
for tax practice error lurks; not because of the complexity of
the statute, but because of the counter-intuitive tax result.
When tax results do not follow economic patterns, intuition
misleads the practitioner and a classic trap for the unwary is
created. Unfortunately, the unwary increasingly includes ex-
perienced tax practitioners.
Rapid change, however, creates an unpredictable future in
our tax system, particularly where the change challenges time-
honored concepts. In a tax system dominated by unpredict-
ability, new ideas tend to give rise to creative litigation to at-
tempt to remedy poor planning, intolerable facts, or simply a
significant change in the social and economic context of the
marketplace where the original idea developed.
6
When the occasion does arise to make new and creative ar-
guments, an intellectual paradigm is necessary to test the
weight and force of the idea. A preeminent paradigm is the
macro-systemic view that taxation of gains and losses is predi-
cated upon the realization of a related economic benefit or
loss. Since many economic gains and losses are reflected in
property transactions, as opposed to cash transactions, the sys-
tem's decision to tax a property transaction at the time of re-
ceipt or to postpone taxation until the disposition of the
property is reflected in the basis of the property. This view of
income taxation suggests that most such decisions are qualita-
tively timing decisions which manifest themselves in the tax
system's basis provisions.
Although a matter of timing and possibly gain characteriza-
tion, 7 the question raised is whether a presumed economic
benefit is sufficiently realized to currently impose a tax. Two
sional conduct in the tax practice area and are not inconsistent with the Minnesota
Rules.
6. An example of the latter kind might be the continued development and ex-
pansion of the concept of disguised loans and interest elements in cash and property
transactions. Contrast the government's discounted present value analysis to arrive
at an estimated fair market value of Mrs. Logan's contingent payment contract in
Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404, 411 n.1 (1931) with the current statutory provisions
for original issue discount (I.R.C. §§ 1272-1275 (West Supp. 1989)), deferred rent
payments (I.R.C. § 467 (West Supp. 1989)), market discount (I.R.C. §§ 1276 and
1278 (West Supp. 1989)), interest in deferred payments (I.R.C. § 483 (West Supp.
1989)), and below market interest rate loans (I.R.C. § 7872 (West Supp. 1989)). See
also Halperin, Interest In Disguise: "Taxing the Time Value Of Money", 95 YALE L.J. 506
(1986).
7. Contrast the discussion in footnotes 9 and 10 below.
[Vol. 16
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recent cases8 involving section 357(c) transfers provide an ex-
cellent opportunity for reconsideration of the propriety of ju-
dicial, legislative, and executive treatment of this issue. The
Ninth Circuit would tax the shareholder on the liability excess
at the time of the transfer 9 while the Second Circuit would not
tax the shareholder at the time of the transfer or at anytime in
the future unless the corporation pays the liabilities subse-
quent to the transfer.' 0
8. Lessinger v. Commissioner, 872 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1989) and Owen v. Com-
missioner, 881 F.2d 832 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 58 U.S.L.W. 3526 (U.S. Feb. 20,
1990).
9. Owen v. Commissioner, 881 F.2d 832 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 58
U.S.L.W. 3526 (U.S. Feb. 20, 1990). This decision presumes that the corporation
will pay the transferred liabilities in the future and thus grants the shareholder a
current basis increase for the recognized section 357(c) gain. If the corporation does
not pay the liabilities, the shareholder's basis in the stock would increase a second
time at the moment of the shareholder's payment of the liability and would either
increase the shareholder's loss or decrease the shareholder's gain on the disposition
of the stock.
An exception occurs if the shareholder holds the stock until death where the
basis in the stock is changed to fair market value at the date of death under section
1014. Any unrealized gain or loss is thereby eliminated at the date of death.
10. Lessinger v. Commissioner, 872 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1989). Under this deci-
sion, the shareholder is either (i) not given a basis increase in the stock at the time of
the transfer because the excess liabilities were not considered "transferred" to the
corporation and therefore did not enter the stock basis equation under sections 357
and 358; or (ii) the shareholder is given a stock basis increase for the liabilities trans-
ferred to the corporation under Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947) and Tufts
v. Commissioner, 461 U.S. 300 (1983) because it is assumed at the time of the trans-
fer that the shareholder and not the corporation will pay the liabilities. Id. at 525-28.
This latter interpretation avoids problems accruing from the shareholder's negative
basis. Several of such problems are discussed below.
If the shareholder does not in fact pay the liabilities in the future because the
corporation pays the liabilities, the shareholder would have income from the dis-
charge of indebtedness at that time. There would be no correlative stock basis in-
crease since the basis increase occurred at the time of the transfer to the corporation.
The recognition timing and income characterization contrast of Owen and Les-
singer and their interpretations of section 357(c) where the shareholder pays ("As-
sumption I"), or does not pay ("Assumption II") the liabilities "transferred" to the
corporation after the transfer is illustrated below. For both examples assume that
depreciable equipment is transferred to the corporation with a basis of $0, subject to
a mortgage of $200, and that prior depreciation deductions equalled $500 since the
original equipment basis was $500. The current fair market value is $100.
1. Assumption I: Shareholder Pays the Liabilities.
Under Owen, the shareholder would recognize a $200 section 357(c) gain at the
time of the incorporation transfer which would be ordinary income under section
1245. The stock basis would be zero. When the shareholder subsequently pays the
"corporate" liabilities of $200, her stock basis would increase to $200. The corpora-
tion now has an asset with a $0 basis and a fair market value of $ 100. When it is sold
it will realize a $100 gain and have $100 to distribute in liquidation (ignoring the
1990]
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I. CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND ANALYSIS
The business world is rife with potential liability. Accord-
ingly, there are numerous considerations that encourage the
operation of a business as a corporation notwithstanding the
attendant "tax costs." These costs include a maximum corpo-
rate tax rate in excess of the maximum individual tax rate l' as
corporate tax liability) which will allow the shareholder to recognize a $100 capital
loss under section 331(a). The shareholder would have recognized a $100 capital
gain but for the $200 basis increase at the time of the incorporation transfer which is
"offset" by a $200 capital loss at the time of the corporate liquidation.
Under Lessinger, the shareholder does not recognize a gain under section 357(c)
at the time of the incorporation. The stock basis is zero based upon the liability
doctrine of Crane and Tufts. The subsequent shareholder payment of "corporate"
debt does not increase stock basis since it was increased at the time of the incorpora-
tion based on the shareholder's future liability payment responsibility. When the
corporation sells the assets for $100 with a zero basis it recognizes a $100 gain and
distributes $100 (ignoring the corporate tax liability) which causes the shareholder to
recognize a $100 capital gain under section 331(a). Thus, the shareholder is not
required to artificially recognize a $200 "gain" under section 357(c) because no gain
existed at the time of the incorporation or later because the shareholder paid the
liabilities with after-tax dollars. This "validates" the economic effect of the prior de-
preciation deductions by occasioning the prior depreciation deductions with a subse-
quent actual economic loss through the payment of liabilities.
II. Assumption II: Corporation Pays the Liabilities
Finally, if the shareholder does not pay the "transferred" liabilities, the choice
presented by the cases is as follows: Owen would force the shareholder to recognize
$200 in ordinary income at the time of the transfer under sections 357(c) and 1245.
The assumption is that the corporation would pay the liabilities. Lessinger would post-
pone that decision until the corporation actually did pay the shareholder liabilities
and at that time tax the shareholder with $200 ordinary income under a section 61
discharge of indebtedness theory.
III. Chart
The following chart illustrates these principles:
Assumption I:
Section 357(c) Stock Basis
Gain Incorp. Debt Pay. Liquidation
Owen $200 0.1. $0 $200 ($200) C.L.
Lessinger 0 0 0 0
Assumption II:
Section 357(c) Stock AB
Gain Incorp. Debt Pay. Liquidation
Owen $200 0.1 $0 0 0
Lessinger 0 0 $200 0.1. 0
11. After the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the maximum effective section 11 corpo-
rate tax rate is 34% while the maximum effective section 1 individual tax rate is 28%.
This is the first time since 1913 that both an individual and corporate tax have co-
existed and the corporate rate has exceeded the individual rate. The corporate rate,
of course, exceeded the individual rate from 1909 until 1913 prior to the enactment
[Vol. 16
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well as a double tax on corporate earnings distributed as divi-
dends.1 2 The most significant nontax corporate attribute is
limited liability. 13
of the first constitutional individual income tax. See I.R.C. §§ 1, 11 (1988 & West
Supp. 1989).
12. Since a shareholder's dividend investment return on a capital investment in
the corporation is not deductible to the corporation, this aspect of corporate earn-
ings is subject to a double tax. First, the earnings are taxed at the corporate level at a
maximum rate of 34% and the balance of the earnings distributed as a dividend are
taxed at the individual shareholder's maximum 28% rate (corporate shareholders are
entitled to a section 243 deduction of either 70% or 100%). For example, a corpora-
tion with $1,000 of earnings will pay a tax of $340 and have $660 available for a
dividend distribution which will be taxed to the shareholder at a 28% rate or
$184.80. Thus, the combined tax paid by the corporation and the individual will be
$524.80 or a combined rate of 52.48% compared to the individual rate of 28%. This
double taxation applies to both income from operations and to pre-contribution gain
from the sale of assets contributed by shareholders. (The same idea would allow the
corporation a double deduction of pre-contribution losses which has evoked a statu-
tory limitation ("anti-stuffing rules" of section 336(d)) to avoid transfers of loss as-
sets to a corporation principally for the purpose of a double loss recognition.)
To compensate for this double tax feature, techniques have evolved which in-
clude (i) eliminating the corporate level tax or (ii) accumulating earnings in corporate
solution to be taxed upon the disposition of the corporate stock in the form of a
higher sales price. This latter technique defers the second shareholder level tax at
the expense of a higher current corporate tax (34%) on a greater pre-tax amount
(earnings on $660 taxed at 34% at the corporate level versus earnings on $475.20
taxed at 28% at the shareholder level). Until the elimination of the preference for
the capital gains tax in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, this was a more attractive tech-
nique because the increased price for the stock was taxed at a lower tax rate (20%)
than the dividend distribution (50%).
The first alternative contemplates efforts to transfer corporate earnings to share-
holders without the earnings first being taxed at the corporate level by creating
a deduction for the withdrawal and payment to the shareholder. This involves
recharacterizing the dividend distribution as a deductible expense. The most com-
mon expense categories include salary withdrawals and interest expense. The former
is limited by § 162(a)(1) which allows deductions only for reasonable compensation.
The latter is limited by § 385 which attempts to govern the ratio of debt and equity in
the capital structure of the corporation. Current legislative efforts are under way to
alter the debt-equity balance by substantially restricting the use of debt in corporate
formations. See infra note 34.
Of course, many small properly structured corporations will be able to avoid the
corporate level tax by electing to be treated as a small business corporation under
§§ 1361-1378. There are, however, significant capital structure limitations ex-
pressed in § 1361(b) which may disqualify many organizations from utilizing these
provisions. In essence, these provisions permit the corporate earnings to be taxed
directly to the shareholders.
13. For a small corporation owned by one person with few if any employees the
limited liability feature may be more illusory than real. Liability will generally arise in
the context of a negotiated contract or the commission of tortious conduct.
With respect to contract liability, most creditors negotiating with the corporation
will require the shareholders' personal guarantee of major contracts absent a signifi-
cant corporate operating history or corporate balance sheet independently justifying
1990]
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In a traditional section 351 incorporation, a shareholder
transfers assets to a corporation in return for all of its stock. In
many cases, these assets may be subject to purchase money se-
curity interests serving as collateral for loans incurred to ac-
quire the assets.' 4  Where the assets were subject to
depreciation prior to the transfer to the corporation or when
the shareholder borrows against significant pre-contribution
asset appreciation, 1 5 the amount of the liabilities at the time of
the credit extension. These creditors include banks, occupancy and equipment les-
sors, as well as significant vendor financed transactions. Ordinary trade creditors
would normally be excluded from this category.
Similarly, if the sole owner-employee of a corporation commits a negligent act
while on company business, the person will be personally liable for the resultant
damage as the primary tortfeasor. In addition, the corporation may also be liable as
the employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Where there are a number
of shareholders, however, the corporate structure may shield the corporate owner's
personal assets from liability for the acts of other negligent employees. The corpora-
tion may also be liable but the owner's liability will ordinarily be limited to the cur-
rent investment in the corporation.
Finally, there is expanding liability for environmental waste problems prompting
a significant consideration of the corporate structure as a method of alleviating per-
sonal liability. The liability extends not only to health hazards, and to those con-
nected to or affected by "hazardous waste," but also to the clean up costs. For
example, the elimination of asbestos in a fifteen year old apartment can be enor-
mously expensive, yet the existence of the liability may not have been known by the
current owner who acquired the building for cash five years ago. In many cases,
where the building is subject to a nonrecourse mortgage, the owner's equity may not
be sufficient to cover the costs of the clean-up. In such a case, the current owner may
simply want to turn the building over to the lender. There may, however, be per-
sonal liability for all connected in the chain of title including lenders. This of course
raises the question of liability allocation among those persons as well as the function
of the nominal corporate owner.
14. For a statutory definition of acquisition indebtedness see I.R.C.
§ 163(h)(3)(B)(i)(I).
15. See Woodsam Associates, Inc. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952)
for an example of the latter circumstance. See also Owen v. Commissioner, 881 F.2d
832 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 58 U.S.L.W. 3526 (U.S. Feb. 20, 1990). Owen is an
example of basis falling below the face amount of debt because of prior depreciation
deductions.
Any attempt to distinguish between these two examples of liability in excess of
basis appears to be fundamentally flawed because the connecting link to the transac-
tions is the existence of a shareholder primary liability which survives the incorpora-
tion transfer. In other words, whether the taxpayer receives cash or a tax deduction,
the fundamental nature of the transactions remains a loan. If the taxpayer consumes
the cash from the loan or the cash is generated by the tax deductions, income does
not exist at the moment of consumption because of the continuing obligation of the
taxpayer to repay the loan. Income or economic benefit does not exist in a tax sense
until the moment that the economic responsibility to repay the liability ceases. Un-
less the incorporation event, therefore, somehow operates to extinguish the tax-
payer's liability (economic equivalent of corporate assumption), it simply is not an
[Vol. 16
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the incorporation may exceed the basis of the assets trans-
ferred to the corporation.
When the assets are subject to liabilities exceeding their ag-
gregate basis, the unambiguous language of the applicable
statutes makes the statutory result certain. 16 To prevent the
shareholder from escaping a tax on the economic benefit,17 the
shareholder will be treated as if a gain was realized at the time
of the incorporation transfer to the extent the liabilities exceed
the aggregate basis of the assets transferred.18 The transfer is
treated as if the shareholder retains the liabilities and the cor-
appropriate or necessary time to treat the taxpayer as if the liability had been re-
leased. As this article will hopefully demonstrate, Congress did not think otherwise
with § 357(c). Rather it simply did not contemplate this result.
16. See I.R.C. §§ 351(a)-(b), 357(c)(1), and 358(a) and (d) (West Supp. 1989).
17. Presumably, such economic benefit is occasioned by the "corporation's pay-
ment" of the shareholder's former liabilities in excess of basis, or the creation of a
"negative basis" in the shareholder's stock. For example, if the shareholder's aggre-
gate bases in the assets transferred was $200, the fair market value (without debt),
$500, and the property subject to a mortgage in the amount of $500,
§§ 358(a)(l)(A)(ii) and(d)(l) would treat the corporation's liability assumption of
$500 as money received and reduce the shareholder's carryover basis in the stock
from the asset basis of $200 to a $300 negative basis. In order to prevent this result,
§ 357(c)(1) taxes the $300 liability excess as a gain from the disposition of theassets
which brings the shareholder's basis to zero under the positive basis adjustment of
§ 358(a)(l)(B)(ii).
Where, however, the corporation has no current or anticipated ability to pay the
"transferred" liabilities attached to assets "subject to" such liabilities, the presump-
tion of this article is that the shareholder may not have realized an "economic bene-
fit" as a result of the transfer.
Notwithstanding Rosen v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 11, 19 n.3 (1973), aff'd, 515
F.2d 507 (3d Cir. 1975), in such an event § 357(c)(1) is not "analogous to other
recapture provisions of the Code .... " Cash withdrawn in the form of loans or tax
deductions do not present an economic benefit by reason of the incorporation trans-
fer when such a transfer has an effect on the transferor's recourse obligations. See
cases cited supra note 15. Moreover, the "recapture" analogy is incomplete and un-
satisfactory. The function of the recapture provisions is to characterize a gain or a
loss on a "sale;" not to create gain or loss where none exists in an economic sense in
the first instance.
18. The "gain" recognized under § 357(c)(1) is based upon the economic release
of liability benefit received by the shareholder on the transfer. See, e.g., Crane v.
Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947); see also Tufts v. Commissioner, 461 U.S. 300
(1983). Thus, the statute establishes and recognizes the minimum gain that the
shareholder would recognize if the assets were transferred for the amount of the
liabilities only.
The concept of minimum gain from liabilities in excess of basis has other func-
tions in the tax system as well. In the partnership tax area, special allocations are
tested under § 704(b) for substantial economic effect. When the allocations are at-
tributable to nonrecourse debt, the concept of a minimum gain chargeback to the
person receiving the allocation validates, in part, the allocation.
1990]
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poration transfers money to the shareholder. This enables the
shareholder to pay the liabilities personally rather than trans-
ferring them to the corporation. Under section 351(b), the
shareholder's realized gain is recognized to the extent of the
money received.
Provided there are valid reasons to support the assumption
that the corporation will pay the liabilities in the future, treat-
ing liabilities in excess of basis the same as a receipt of money
seems fair enough. But consider the result if the incorporation
transfer assumption cannot fairly be made. What if it is unrea-
sonable to assume that the corporation will or can indepen-
dently pay the liabilities? If the shareholder must pay the
liabilities either directly through a guarantee or indirectly
through additional capital contributions, what is the implicit
assumption of section 357(c) with regard to taxing transferred
liabilities in excess of basis as if a "gain" had occurred? Is it
relevant to ask what Congress had in mind in enacting section
357(c) in 1954? Finally, if it is determined that Congress never
considered that the corporation may never pay the liabilities,
what is the appropriate judicial response to the dilemma until
and if Congress decides to respond with a clarifying
amendment?
The answers to these questions depend in part upon the fac-
tual context in which the issue of probable corporate nonpay-
ment arises. Whether the shareholder pays the liabilities
directly because of a guarantee or indirectly through additional
corporate capital contributions, enabling the corporation to
pay the liabilities, the issue is the same: at the time of the incor-
poration transfer, is it reasonably clear that the corporation
will be unable to independently make the liability payments in
the future?
Many factors may contribute to this problem. Yet these fac-
tors become significant only when it appears that at the time of
the asset and liability transfers, the corporation has no reason-
able expectation of independently accepting responsibility for
payment of the liabilities. This is especially true where the cor-
poration has a negative net worth at the time of the transfer
and either no operating history or an operating history that
suggests the corporation will not be able to pay the liabilities.
In this context, a range ofjudicial responses to the language
of section 35 7 (c) are possible. Courts might determine that
[Vol. 16
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the liabilities were not in fact transferred to the corporation
either through the "assumption" or "subject to" language of
section 357(c). Alternatively, it could be determined that the
shareholder has not received the kind of "economic benefit"
imagined by the statute when it is likely that the corporation
will not in fact pay the liabilities. Moreover, the response
might be that the language of the statute is clear and it is the
responsibility of Congress to change it, not the courts.
A. Indirect Shareholder Payment
What is the result if at the time of the incorporation transfer,
the shareholder also transfers an agreement to make future
cash capital contributions secured by a note with a fair market
value equal to its face value?' 9 The shareholder will receive
additional basis in her stock when the note is paid in due
course. Moreover, the agreement to transfer money in the fu-
ture under the terms of the note negates the presumed "eco-
nomic benefit" occurring as a result of the corporation paying
the liabilities in the future. In effect, the shareholder maintains
economic responsibility for a portion of the liabilities "trans-
ferred" to the corporation.
Should such notes be disregarded at the time of transfer to
the corporation or should they be treated as true acquisition
debt paid as partial consideration for the stock of the corpora-
tion? If treated as true debt, should the liabilities not result
in an increase in the stock's basis at the time of the
incorporation?
B. Direct Shareholder Payment
If economic rationality mandates treating the shareholder
note as true debt, is there any meaningful distinction between
these notes and a shareholder's continuing primary liability for
debt secured, in part, by assets transferred to the corporation
where the corporation does not pay the debt? What if the
shareholder must continue to provide payment guarantee to
obtain lender approval because of a weak corporate financial
condition? This may be particularly true where the corpora-
tion is new and the assets transferred to the corporation are
19. This would be the case where the note states a market interest rate for the
associated credit rating of the shareholder and any collateral pledged to secure pay-
ment of the note.
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not sufficient in value to cover the liabilities. What would be
the impact, if any, of a shareholder pledging personal assets to
the lender to secure the corporate debt? If shareholder notes
are to be treated differently than shareholder guarantees, will
not all properly advised shareholders execute notes to formal-
ize their guarantees?
If section 357(c) is not invoked at the time of the transfer,
what happens if the shareholder does not pay the note in due
course and the corporation forgives payment? Alternatively,
what happens if the shareholder is not required to make pay-
ments on the guarantee because the corporation makes the
payments? Must not income be recognized at that time under
a discharge of indebtedness theory? 20 If a shareholder is given
basis in the stock for the amount of the section 357(c)(1) liabil-
ities in excess of basis as true acquisition indebtedness, why
should basis not be increased if the note exceeds this amount?
Finally, if the shareholder's economic responsibilities are dis-
regarded, a section 357(c) gain recognized, and a denial of a
basis allowed for these kinds of notes and guarantees, are not
taxpayers without the benefit of sophisticated tax planning pe-
nalized? Are we simply not encouraging tax planners to
"cover up" their mistakes by backdating or creating new post-
incorporation documents?
These are not intended to be rhetorical questions. The an-
swers, as provided by two recent federal appellate court opin-
ions, may be surprising.
The courts and the Internal Revenue Service have tradition-
ally interpreted section '357(c) without addressing the eco-
nomic reality associated with such notes and guaranteed
liabilities. Yet in other contexts, such as with the acquisition of
property, the taxpayer is given basis credit for the fair market
value of her own acquisition notes and other liabilities which
are treated as true debt. If true debt is recognized and re-
flected in the basis of property because of the economic re-
sponsibility to repay debt in the future, why the disparate tax
treatment of notes and guaranteed liabilities in the context of a
section 357(c) transfer?
This result is particularly troubling when the economic sub-
stance of the transactions does not justify the distinction. The
20. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(12).
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taxpayer could presumably borrow the funds from another
source, contribute the loan proceeds to the corporation, liqui-
date the loan in due course, achieve basis credit at the time of
the contribution, and avoid the section 357(c) gain. The fact
that the corporation is the creditor is economically irrelevant
to the shareholder.
Of course, with proper tax planning, the taxpayer would
never have transferred liabilities to the corporation in an
amount in excess of the transferred asset basis. This is particu-
larly true where the shareholder must remain liable on the
debt anyway and the lending institution continues to look to
the shareholder for repayment, ignoring the corporation. This
is not an unusual circumstance with the incorporation of small,
closely-held corporations. In such a case, the shareholder may
have personal and even liquid assets pledged against the now
guaranteed corporate loan. It only seems prudent in such
cases to eliminate the debt in excess of basis problem by bifur-
cating the lender liability 2' and not transferring the excess
amount of the liability to the corporation. 22 If this is not feasi-
ble, another planning solution is to transfer additional assets
with basis in an amount sufficient to offset the excess of liabili-
ties over basis. In any event, if there is no substantive eco-
nomic difference in these forms, why overlay an interpretation
on section 357(c) that places a premium on sophisticated tax
advice and thereby creates a trap for the unwary?
When it must deal with contributions of personal notes and
the guarantee of transferred liabilities, the Internal Revenue
Service is placed in the position of policing such debt struc-
tures. Thus, the Service's role is to assure that the notes are in
fact true debt whose commercially reasonable terms are subse-
quently observed by shareholder, rather than corporate pay-
ment. But this is not an unreasonable role and it is one in
21. The corporation would not assume the excess liabilities. In addition, it
would seek the lender's approval of the transaction through a partial release of the
security interest.
22. Notwithstanding the favorable treatment given to this kind of transfer in
Jackson v. Commissioner, 708 F.2d 1402 (9th Cir. 1983), it remains a questionable
practice, particularly outside the Ninth Circuit. Section 357(c) continues to apply
where the corporation takes the property "subject to" the debt. Thus, if the asset
transferred to the corporation continues to act as collateral for the loan, this reason-
ing would appear to be in conflict with the plain language of the statute.
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which the Service already finds itself with regard to other
forms of related party debt transactions.
If the liabilities are deemed transferred to the corporation,
even though the shareholder remains economically responsi-
ble, the incorporation and basis statutes may be interpreted as
creating a negative basis in the shareholder's stock. Equitable
solutions to the problem of negative basis, other than those
found in section 357(c) exist. The most realistic and consistent
with current tax policy include: 1) recognizing the true eco-
nomic nature of the shareholder notes or guarantees at the
moment of incorporation, thereby eliminating a current sec-
tion 357(c) gain; and 2) taxing the shareholder when and if the
corporation pays the liabilities. In this way, tax law reflects
rather than dictates economic rationality, a more suitable pol-
icy where tax abuse and avoidance is not present. The share-
holder is not taxed under section 357(c) on a "presumed
economic benefit" and is instead taxed on future economic
benefit only if it in fact arises.
Nevertheless, modern interpretations of section 357(c) have
not paid attention to these solutions, but rather have focused
on plain meaning. In part, this may be because the courts have
asked the wrong questions. The statute simply may not con-
template the shareholder paying liabilities which appeared to
have been transferred to the corporation. The relevant ques-
tion seems to require a more fundamental examination. Such
an approach examines when and under what circumstances a
taxpayer should be entitled to treat its continuing debt respon-
sibility as true debt for economic basis purposes under the re-
lated judicial doctrines of Commissioner v. Tufts, and Crane v.
Commissioner.23 The problem described may be solved in the
short run by judicial construction confining the statute to its
intended purpose. In the long run, an amendment to section
357(c) may be necessary. This is not unlike the situation re-
sulting from the 1978 amendment to section 357(c) regarding
the tax treatment of accounts payable.
Prior to the amendment, incorporation of ongoing cash
method businesses possessing accounts receivable and ac-
counts payable faced a problem: the accounts receivable did
not have an income tax basis but the related accounts payable
23. Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983); Crane v. Commissioner, 331
U.S. 1 (1947).
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were included at their face amount. This resulted in a gain
from liabilities (payables) in excess of basis (receivables). In
order to avoid this harsh result, judicial decisions did not inter-
pret the accounts payable as "liabilities" for purposes of sec-
tion 357(c).24 Subsequently in 1978, section 357(c) was
amended to provide in subdivision (3) that accounts payable
were not liabilities under section 357.25
Consistent with the 1978 amendments, recent decisions rec-
ognize the compelling economic arguments of taxpayers in the
context of incorporation transfers where liabilities exceed ba-
sis. This is particularly true where the assets transferred to the
corporation merely act as security for the loans but the eco-
nomic responsibility remains with the shareholder. In this in-
stance, even though the corporation has not "assumed" the
liabilities either formally or economically, the "subject to" lan-
guage of section 357(c) appears to mandate taxation of a gain
presuming an economic benefit to the shareholder.
This may be more appropriate with nonrecourse loans as the
shareholder's personal responsibility to pay the liabilities
transfers with the asset. Recognizing a gain may therefore be
necessary to avoid permanently escaping taxation on the gain
or, alternatively, creating a negative basis in the stock received
in the exchange. 26
24. Early decisions in the United States Tax Court gave § 357(c) liabilities a
broad and inclusive meaning. See Thatcher v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 28 (1973), rev'd
in part and aff'd in part, 533 F.2d 1114 (9th Cir. 1976); Bongiovanni v. Commissioner,
30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1124 (1971), rev'd, 470 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1972); Raich v. Commis-
sioner, 46 T.C. 604 (1966). The courts developed three approaches to alleviate this
problem. First, the Second Circuit concluded that the term "liability" under § 357(c)
did not include accounts payable. See Bongiovanni v. Commissioner, 470 F.2d 921
(2d Cir. 1972). Second, the Ninth Circuit permitted the shareholder an immediate
deduction of the accounts payable to offset the § 357(c) gain. See Thatcher v. Com-
missioner, 533 F.2d 114 (9th Cir. 1976). The first two approaches developed from
reversals of the tax court's position that the language of § 357(c) was clear and unam-
biguous.
Third, after these reversals, the tax court reversed its long standing position and
determined that the term "liability" under § 357(c) would be limited to those debts
which, if transferred, would cause gain recognition under Crane. The tax court also
determined that the term would not include liabilities which would have been de-
ductible if paid by the transferor. See Focht v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 223 (1977).
See Kahn, A Definition of "Liabilities " In Internal Revenue Code Sections 357 and 358(d), 73
MIcH. L. REV. 461 (1975) (co-authored by Dale Oesterle), for an analysis of these
three approaches.
25. Revenue Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 2763, 2854-55 (1978) (codified as amended at
26 U.S.C. § 357(a), (c) (1980)).
26. See Woodsam Assocs., Inc. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952).
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When recourse liabilities are involved, a different economic
picture emerges depending upon whether the corporation or
the shareholder intends to and does pay the liabilities. When
the corporation is incapable of payment because the fair mar-
ket value of the assets is less than their adjusted basis, the
shareholder does not realize the kind of economic benefit envi-
sioned by section 357(c).
Increasingly, the judiciary is becoming dissatisfied with the
inadequate language and solutions provided by section 357(c).
In Lessinger, the Second Circuit ("Lessinger II ") reversed the tax
court ("Lessinger I") by recognizing the economic equivalence
of the taxpayer's note. The court gave Lessinger basis in the
note and additional basis in the transaction such that the sum
of the liabilities transferred to the corporation did not exceed
the aggregate basis of the assets transferred. 27
In Owen, the Ninth Circuit ("Owen II") affirmed the tax
court's decision ("Owen I") that a taxpayer's personal guaran-
tee did not increase the taxpayer's basis in assets transferred or
decrease the amount of liabilities effectively "assumed" by the
transferee corporation. The Ninth Circuit also sanctioned the
tax court's summary decision in Owen I to reduce the amount
of liabilities assumed by the corporation by $100,000, the
amount of a certificate of deposit pledged to the bank. The
certificate of deposit remained the "asset" of the taxpayer and
not of the transferee corporation. 28
This may be looking for a silver lining in the Ninth Circuit
opinion since Owen II represents a restriction of the court's
earlier holding in Jackson v. Commissioner.29 At the very least,
Owen II represents a failure to expand the court's Jackson
doctrine.30
27. Lessinger v. Commissioner, 872 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1989); Lessinger v. Com-
missioner, 85 T.C. 824 (1985).
28. See Owen v. Commissioner, 881 F.2d 832 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 58
U.S.L.W. 3526 (U.S. Feb. 20, 1990) and Owen v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH)
1480 (1987). This issue was not argued on appeal by the government which means
that either the issue was missed, or that the government approves of the treatment.
A discussion with the taxpayer's appellate counsel indicated that the government
missed the appeal on the matter but does not approve of the treatment.
29. Jackson v. Commissioner, 708 F.2d 1402 (9th Cir. 1983).
30. The Owen H Ninth Circuit opinion does not refer to the Lessinger H Second
Circuit opinion even though the latter was decided on March 29, 1989 and the for-
mer was decided on August 9, 1989. A conversation with the appellate counsel for
the taxpayer in Owen I and Owen II showed that counsel was aware of the earlier
Lessinger decision even though it was decided after the December 5, 1988 argument
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The tax court obviously does not consider its interpretation
of section 357(c) on a slippery slope, but that view may not be
universal. In Owen I it relied on its own LessingerI 3' decision as
primary authority. Of course, Lessinger I was reversed by the
Second Circuit. 32 There is a substantive conflict between the
Second Circuit in Lessinger H and the Ninth Circuit in Owen H.
On November 2, 1989, the taxpayer in Owen II filed a Petition
for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court to
review the conflict between the circuits. 33
II. STATUTORY ANALYSIS OF INCORPORATION TRANSFERS
A. In General
In general, neither a transferee corporation nor its share-
holders recognize gain or loss on the transfer of assets to the
corporation or the corporation's issuance of stock or securi-
ties. 34 Under section 1032, the corporation does not recognize
gain or loss on the issuance of its own stock (including treasury
stock) in exchange for money or other property. The corpora-
tion takes a carryover basis under section 362 in the contrib-
uted assets. If the corporation acquires the assets in a taxable
transaction, its basis will be a section 1012 cost basis.
A shareholder's acquisition of stock for cash is not a taxable
event for the shareholder. Rather, it is an investment that will
generate income or loss at the time of the disposition of the
stock.35 Where, on the other hand, the shareholder's invest-
date. The taxpayer's counsel, however, decided not to raise or brief the issue be-
cause of factual differences in the two cases and because he believed the Ninth Cir-
cuit's rationale in Jackson was his best argument.
31. Lessinger v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 824 (1985).
32. Lessinger, 872 F.2d at 526. The court held that "where the transferor under-
takes genuine personal liability to the transferee, 'adjusted basis' in section 357(c)
refers to the transferee's basis in the obligation which is its face amount." Id. (foot-
notes omitted).
33. 58 U.S.L.W. 3336 (U.S. Nov. 21, 1989)(No. 89-715). For an analysis of cir-
cuit court conflict in general, see Bryan, Crosby, Powell & Sayre, An Empirical Study of
Intercircuit Conflicts on Federal Income Tax, 9 VA. TAx. REV. 1 (1989).
34. On September 20, 1989, the House approved the Revenue Reconciliation
Bill of 1989 containing § 11203 which would alter the tax-free treatment of the re-
ceipt of securities in a § 351 transaction. The bill specifies circumstances in which it
appears the taxpayer has "cashed out" the assets transferred. Since there is a contro-
versy over the receipt of securities, and the point of this article can be adequately
made by referring only to stock, the receipt of securities will not be discussed.
35. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920) for the development of the judi-
cial realization requirement.
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ment in the corporate stock is made in exchange for appreci-
ated or depreciated property, there is a current gain or loss
realization. This event is taxable under section 1001(a) in an
amount equal to the difference between the bases of the assets
given up and the fair market value 36 of the stock received.
Under section 1001 (c), the realized gain or loss must be recog-
nized absent a controlling nonrecognition statute such as sec-
tion 351.
Under section 351(a), a shareholder will not recognize gain
or loss on a transfer of property3 7 to a corporation provided
that (i) immediately after the transfer the shareholder and any
other transferrers are (ii) in control38 of the transferee corpo-
ration (iii) and the property is transferred solely for stock or
securities of the transferor corporation. If any shareholder re-
ceives other property in addition to such stock or securities,
section 351(b) provides that gain (but not loss) will be recog-
nized to the extent of the amount of money received and the
fair market value of other property.
3 9
B. Liabilities in Excess of Basis
Any excess over the aggregate adjusted basis of the proper-
ties transferred to the corporation by the shareholder is
treated as a minimum gain under section 357(c)(1). The ex-
cess is determined by adding the sum of the liabilities "as-
sumed" by the corporation to the liabilities to which the
transferred properties are "subject." The character of the gain
36. Under United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962) the fair market value of
property received in an arm's length commercial transaction is presumed equal to the
fair market value of the property transferred in the exchange. Thus, if the stock is
difficult to value, it will be presumed to be equal in value to the assets transferred to
the corporation.
37. Under § 351(d), transferee corporate stock or securities issued for share-
holder services and certain specified transferee corporation debt and interest will not
be treated as if issued for in return for property causing the transferrers of such
assets to recognize income or gain under §§ 1001 and 83.
38. See I.R.C. § 368(c) (West Supp. 1989) (providing that "control" for this pur-
pose means the ownership of stock with at least 80% of both (i) the total combined
voting power of all classes of voting stock, and (ii) the total number of shares of all
classes of nonvoting stock).
39. Compare this result with the result under § 357(c)(1). This section provides
that "if the sum of the amount of the liabilities assumed, plus the amount of the
liabilities to which the property is subject, exceeds the total of the adjusted basis of
the property . . . then such excess shall be considered as a gain...." Under
§ 351(b)(1), the receipt of boot forces recognition only the to the extent of realized
gain.
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is determined by the character of the assets transferred. 40
Where there are multiple asset transfers, the resulting section
357(c) gain is allocated among the assets for characterization
purposes according to the relative fair market values of the
assets. 4'
1. Stock Basis
Under section 358(a), a shareholder's basis in stock received
is equal to the basis of the assets transferred to the corporation
increased by any gain recognized on the transfer and de-
creased by the amount of loss recognized and the sum of the
"boot" received. "Boot" is a technical synonym for the
amount of money and the fair market value of other property
received; in other words, nonqualified property which would
cause recognition under section 351(b). Section 358(d) pro-
vides that any liabilities of the shareholder assumed by the cor-
poration in the transfer, or to which the assets transferred were
subject, are not treated as money received. Money is treated as
boot and requires immediate recognition of gain. Liabilities
transferred to the corporation first reduce the taxpayer's basis
in the stock. The stock basis in turn is a carryover basis from
the taxpayer's aggregate basis in the assets transferred.
The distinction between the section 351 tax treatment ac-
corded to boot and liabilities is important and is reflected in
the principles supporting section 357. As a general rule, sec-
tion 357(a) provides that the transferee corporation's assump-
tion of liabilities is not treated as a receipt of money or other
property. In these circumstances, the taxpayer is entitled to
the more preferential treatment of recovering its basis in the
40. Rev. Rul. 60-302, 1960-2 C.B. 223.
41. See Treas. Reg. § 1.357-2(b) (Example 1). This situation often produces
counter-intuitive results where one or more of the assets transferred is a loss asset.
In such a case, the fair market value of the loss asset will determine the character of a
portion of the gain even though the asset was not responsible for any of the gain.
Moreover, the corporation's basis in the loss asset received is presumably increased
by the correlative amount of the gain under § 362 which has the effect of increasing
the loss to the asset.
Since the character allocation rule of Treas. Reg. § 1.357-2(b) appears in Exam-
ple 1, perhaps this methodology can be considered illustrative only where all the
assets are gain assets. Where some of the assets are loss assets, a more realistic ap-
proach may be to allocate the gain to assets for characterization purposes in accord-
ance with the ratio of the gain on each asset. Since consistency is the hallmark of
success in these cases, it would then be appropriate to follow the same plan under
§ 362 when determining the basis of the assets to the corporation.
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assets transferred before any gain is recognized on the ex-
change. 42 This is reflected by a correlative basis reduction in
the shareholder's stock under sections 358(a) and (d). The re-
sult is that the shareholder will recognize any gain on the
transfer when a disposition of the stock occurs. Sections
351(a), 357(a), and 358(a), therefore, only defer the recogni-
tion of gain until disposition of the stock. Thus, the share-
holder's release of liabilities in the transfer is not a tax
equivalent to a cash out or a receipt of boot.43
2. Negative Basis
Another problem may arise where the sum of the liabilities
transferred exceeds the shareholder's aggregate basis in the
assets transferred. The liabilities are still preferentially treated
as a return of the shareholder's basis in the assets transferred.
But once the aggregate basis is recovered, either the share-
holder must be permitted a "negative basis" 44 in the stock, or,
alternatively, the excess of liabilities over basis of the assets
transferred must be treated as boot requiring the shareholder
to recognize gain. Not surprisingly, the statute takes the ap-
proach of requiring gain recognition.
Section 357(c)(1) requires liabilities in excess of transferred-
asset basis to be treated as gain from the sale of the assets
transferred. Moreover, section 358(a) reflects this treatment
and prevents the shareholder from acquiring a negative basis
in the stock by giving the shareholder a zero basis. Thus, in all
cases where the shareholder recognizes a section 357(c)(1)
gain, the resultant section 358(a) basis in the corporate stock
will be zero.
45
42. This preferential basis-first treatment is reminiscent of "open transaction"
reporting of "sales" under Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404, 413 (1931) which was
virtually eliminated with the 1980 amendments to section 453 installment sales.
I.R.C. § 453 (West Supp. 1989). See S. REP., No. 96-1000, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 25,
26 (1980).
43. If the stock is considered a § 1221 capital asset, the shareholder may convert
the character of the gain from ordinary to capital. Capital gains have the advantage
of a full absorption of capital losses under § 1211 (b) and the possible future advan-
tage of a preferential tax rate if Congress restores the capital gain preference.
44. For a discussion of the historical roots of the negative basis concept see
Cooper, Negative Basis, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1352 (1962). See also Parker v. Delaney, 186
F.2d 455, 459-60 (1st Cir. 1950) (Magruder, J., concurring), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 926
(1951) (approving the concept of a negative basis in a pre-1954 and therefore pre-
section 357(c) case).
45. Oddly enough, this process does not permit the taxpayer to recognize loss
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a. Historical Development of Negative Basis
This was not always the result. Section 357(c) was not en-
acted until the 1954 Internal Revenue Code. In Easson v. Com-
missioner, the taxpayer owned a building valued at $300,000,
possessing a basis of $87,000, and subject to a mortgage in the
amount of $247,000.46 The taxpayer transferred the building,
subject to the mortgage, to a newly formed corporation in ex-
change for all of the corporation's stock.
The applicable statutes then governing the transaction were
sections 112(b)(5) and (c)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1939. These sections provided that gain was to be recognized
only to the extent of the fair market value of money and other
property received. 47 Section 112(k) provided that the corpora-
tion's assumption of the mortgage did not constitute the re-
ceipt of money or other property. 48 The statutes, therefore,
did not require the recognition of gain by the shareholder.
Moreover, the shareholder's basis in the stock was determined
under section 113(a) (6). This section provided for a carryover
basis of $87,000, reduced by the fair market value of any
money or other property received. For this purpose, the cor-
poration's assumption of the $247,000 mortgage was to be
treated as money. 49 On the basis of the statutory language,
under § 351(b) where the fair market value of the property has fallen below its ad-
justed basis and is subject to a liability equal to its adjusted basis. In such cases, the
liability assumption absorbs the basis without a correlative loss recognition. Perhaps
this is the intent of the statute, at least with respect to nonrecourse debt. Illustrative
of this intent is the 1984 enactment of § 7701(g) which provides that in such cases,
the fair market value is presumed to be not less than the debt, in which case, there
would be no loss. In such cases, the taxpayer may well be wise to sell the asset,
recognize the loss, and contribute the cash.
46. 294 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1961), rev', Easson v. Commissioner 33 T.C. 963
(1960) (a pre-1954 Internal Revenue Code case). These figures are rounded for sim-
plicity. The actual figures were a fair market value of $320,000, an adjusted basis of
$87,214.86, and a mortgage balance of $247,064.01. Id. at 654. Apparently the
property had appreciated significantly during its ownership by Mr. Easson and he
elected to withdraw part of the appreciation in a tax-free refinancing. This refinanc-
ing did not affect his basis in the property since he did not use the proceeds to im-
prove the property. Regarding tax-free refinancing see Woodsam Assocs., Inc. v.
Commissioner, 198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952).
47. I.R.C. §§ 112(b)(5) and (c)(l) (1939), Act ofJan. 2, 1939, ch. 1, 53 Stat. 37,
39 (repealed 1954).
48. I.R.C. § 112(k) (1939), Act of June 29, 1939, ch. 247, § 213, 53 Stat. 870
(current version at I.R.C. § 357(a)).
49. Easson v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 963, 971 (1960), rev'd, 294 F.2d 653 (9th
Cir. 1961).
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Mr. Easson appeared to have a tax-free incorporation followed
by a negative basis in his stock of $160,000.50 The Internal
Revenue Service took issue with Easson's reasoning.
Adopting a circular analysis, the tax court assumed that since
a taxpayer could not have a negative basis in property, Eas-
son's resultant basis was zero. This resulted in the elimination
of the gain inherent in the carryover basis of the stock.5' This
flawed analysis resulted in an unwarranted increase in the basis
of the stock from a negative $160,000 to zero. The court then
taxed Easson on the liability in excess of basis, or $160,000, at
the time of the transfer.52 With regard to the tax court's as-
sumption that property could not have a negative basis, the
court reasoned:
It is a fundamental concept of income taxation to tax gain
when its fruits are available for payment of the tax. If a neg-
ative basis were allowed then recognition of gain could be
deferred until a subsequent loss sale or even an abandon-
ment, and unless [the] taxpayer had other resources the tax
would never be collected. 53
The tax court's result can be rationalized more as resisting a
taxpayer windfall than as being anti-negative basis. Neverthe-
less, the question remained whether the Easson court's assump-
tion regarding negative basis was accurate.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal's review of Easson was
more considered of the negative basis concept than was the tax
court's footnote assumption. The court of appeals concluded
that there was no authority or practical reason why the tax-
payer could not have a negative basis. 54 The court viewed the
matter as any other nonrecognition event with the resulting
stock basis, negative or positive, simply reflecting the untaxed
gain or loss inherent in the taxpayer's transaction. 55 Thus, the
court reasoned that the taxpayer would recognize all his gain
on the subsequent disposition of the stock, including the
50. The $247,000 amount of the mortgage less the $87,000 amount of pre-ex-
isting basis in the land and building transferred to the corporation.
51. 33 T.C. at 969-70.
52. Id. at 970.
53. Id. at n.8. The fruit metaphor presumably springs from the famous fruit and
tree income tax metaphor of Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920) popularized in
Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
54. 294 F.2d 653, 660-61 (9th Cir. 1961).
55. Id.
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amount attributable to the negative basis. 56
Notwithstanding the Ninth Circuit's decision in Easson, the
advent of section 357(c) in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
itself raised the question of whether Congress intended to pre-
clude a negative basis in a tax-free transfer. Although it is not
entirely free from doubt, it appears that Congress did consider
the issue of negative basis.57 Consequently, any resolution of
the section 357(c) problem must not be resolved by a negative
basis analysis, at least in light of a legislative change of posture.
b. Legislative History of Section 351
Prior to the Internal Revenue Act of 1921, property received
as part of an exchange was treated as the equivalent of cash to
the extent of its fair market value for purposes of determining
gain or loss. 58 Such exchanges included contributions of prop-
erty to newly created corporations in exchange for the corpo-
ration's stock. This tax result proved to be too restrictive and
was seriously interfering with necessary business readjust-
ments because it resulted in taxation of technical gains often
represented by only a change in the form of the investment. 59
In order to facilitate mere change in form incorporation
transfers, Congress enacted section 202(c)(3) 60 as part of the
56. Id. at 661.
57. See Cooper, Negative Basis, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1352, 1360 (1962).
58. The Revenue Act of 1918, § 202(b), 40 Stat. 1057, 1060 (1918) (repealed
1921), read as follows: "When property is exchanged for other property, the prop-
erty received in exchange shall for the purpose of determining gain or loss be treated
as the equivalent of cash to the amount of its fair market value, if any."
59. H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921); S. REP. No. 275, 67th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1921).
60. Section 202(c)(3) provided, in part:
Sec. 202. (a) That the basis for ascertaining the gain derived or loss sus-
tained from a sale or other disposition of property, real, personal, or mixed,
acquired after February 28, 1913, shall be the cost of such property; except
that-
(c) For purposes of this title, on an exchange of property, real, personal
or mixed, for any other such property, no gain or loss shall be recognized
unless the property received in exchange has a readily realizable market
value; but even if the property received in exchange has a readily realizable
market value, no gain or loss shall be recognized-
(3) When (A) a person transfers any property, real, personal or
mixed, to a corporation, and immediately after the transfer is in control
of such corporation, or (B) two or more persons transfer any such prop-
erty to a corporation, and immediately after the transfer are in control
of such corporation, and the amounts of stock, securities, or both, re-
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Revenue Act of 1921 ("1921 Act"). The statute was designed
to permit formal and organizational business readjustments
without the recognition of technical or paper profits created by
transfers to controlled corporations. 6' Under section
202(d)(1), the transferor was given a substituted basis in the
stock and/or securities received in the exchange; the same as
the basis of the property transferred to the corporation.
However, if in addition to receiving nonrecognition property
in the form of stock or securities of the transferee corporation,
the transferor also received money and/or other property, sec-
tion 202(e) provided that the amount of money and the readily
realizable market value of the other property received was to
reduce the basis of the property transferred (and hence the ba-
sis of the nonrecognition stock and/or securities received).
The transfer was taxable to the extent of the excess over the
basis of the property transferred.
This version of section 202(e) was amended in 1923.62 The
amendment provided that the receipt of property other than
nonrecognition property would cause any gain realized to be
ceived by such persons are in substantially the same proportion as their
interests in the property before such transfer. For the purposes of this
paragraph, a person is, or two or more persons are, "in control" of a
corporation when owning at least 80 per centum of the voting stock and
at least 80 per centum of the total number of shares of all other classes
of stock of the corporation.
(d) (1) Where property is exchanged for other property and no gain or
loss is recognized under the provisions of subdivision (c), the property re-
ceived shall, for purposes of this section, be treated as taking the place of
the property exchanged therefore, except as provided in subdivision (e);
(e) Where property is exchanged for other property which has no read-
ily realizable market value, together with money or other property which has
a readily realizable market value, then the money or the fair market value of
the property having such readily realizable market value received in ex-
change shall be applied against and reduce the basis, provided in this sec-
tion, of the property exchanged, and if in excess of such basis, shall be
taxable to the extent of the excess; BUT WHEN PROPERTY IS EXCHANGED FOR
PROPERTY SPECIFIED IN PARAGRAPHS (1), (2), AND (3) OF SUBDIVISION (C) AS
RECEIVED IN EXCHANGE, TOGETHER WITH MONEY OR OTHER PROPERTY OF A
READILY REALIZABLE MARKET VALUE OTHER THAN THAT SPECIFIED IN SUCH
PARAGRAPHS, THE MONEY OR THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF SUCH OTHER PROP-
ERTY RECEIVED IN EXCHANGE SHALL BE APPLIED AGAINST AND REDUCE THE BA-
SIS, PROVIDED IN THIS SECTION, OF THE PROPERTY EXCHANGED, AND IF IN
EXCESS OF SUCH BASIS, SHALL BE TAXABLE TO THE EXTENT OF THE EXCESS.
Revenue Act of 1921, §§ 202(a), (c), 42 Stat. 229 (1921) (emphasis added).
61. H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924); S. REP. No. 398, 68th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1924). See also Portland Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 479, 488
(1st Cir. 1940).
62. Act of March 4, 1923, § 2, 42 Stat. 1560 (1923).
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recognized 63 to the extent of the amount of the money re-
ceived plus the fair market value of any other property
received.6
The Revenue Act of 1924 ("1924 Act") made only minor
changes to these provisions, though the language and the sec-
tion numbers changed somewhat. 65 Section 202(a) of the 1924
Act provided that the gain or loss from the sale or other dispo-
sition of property was to be determined by comparing the
amount realized in the disposition to the basis of the property
surrendered. The amount realized was defined as the amount
of money received plus the fair market value of any other prop-
erty received under section 202(c). This language was the gen-
esis of the current counterpart found in sections 1001(a)
through (c) and was designed to eliminate the confusion with
regard to determinations of whether property had a readily re-
alizable value. 6
6
The language of the gain and basis provisions of the Reve-
nue Act of 1921, as modified in 1923, found in 202(c)(3),
(d)(1), and (e), was replaced by 203(b)(4), 67 (d)(1), 68 (i),69 and
63. The idea was that the only portion of the taxpayer's gain realized on the
exchange which should qualify for deferral under the statute was the amount not
represented by the receipt of boot. See S. REP. No. 1113, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. 3
(1923).
64. The language of § 202(e) was altered by adding the following: "[T]he
amount of the gain resulting from such exchange shall be computed in accordance
with subdivisions (a) and (b) of this section, but in no such case shall the taxable gain
exceed the amount of the money and the fair market value of such other property
received in exchange." Act of March 4, 1923, § 2, 42 Stat. 1560 (1923).
65. H.R. REP. No. 179, supra note 61, at 13.
66. Id.
67. See id. Sections 203(a) and (b) provide in relevant part:
(a) Upon the sale or exchange of property the entire amount of the gain
or loss, determined under section 202, shall be recognized, except as here-
inafter provided in this section.
(b)(4) No gain or loss shall be recognized if property is transferred to a
corporation by one or more persons solely in exchange for stock or securi-
ties in such corporation, and immediately after the exchange such person or
persons are in control of the corporation; but in the case of an exchange by
two or more persons this paragraph shall apply only if the amount of the
stock and securities received by each is substantially in proportion to his
interest in the property prior to the exchange.
Revenue Act of 1924, §§ 203(a)-(b), 43 Stat. 256 (1924).
68. H.R. REP. No. 179, supra note 61, at 14. Section 203(d)(1) provides in rele-
vant part:
If an exchange would be within the provisions of paragraph (1), (2), or
(4) of subdivision (b) if it were not for the fact that the property received in
the exchange consists not only of property permitted by such paragraph to
be received without the recognition of gain, but also of other property or
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204(a)(6). 70 In addition, 204(a)(8) was added to provide the
transferee corporation a carryover basis from the shareholder,
increased or decreased by the amount of gain or loss recog-
nized by the shareholder on the transfer.7'
There were no changes to these provisions in the Revenue
Act of 1926, and the Revenue Act of 1928 only changed the
section numbers. These section number revisions stayed with
the provisions until they were modified by the Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1954.72 The general nonrecognition rule of sec-
tion 203(b)(4) was renumbered as section 112(b)(5); the boot
gain provision of section 203(d)(1) was changed to section
112(c)(1); and the control definition was changed from section
money, then the gain, if any, to the recipient shall be recognized. but in an
amount not in excess of the sum of such money and the fair market value of
such other property.
Revenue Act of 1924, § 203(d)(1), 43 Stat. 253, 257 (1924).
69. Section 203(i) provides in relevant part: "As used in this section the term
"control" means the ownership of at least 80 percentum of the voting stock and at
least 80 per centum of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock of the
corporation." Revenue Act of 1924, § 203(i), 43 Stat. 253, 258 (1924).
70. Section 204(a)(6) provides in relevant part:
If the property was acquired upon an exchange described in subdivision
(b), (d), (e), or (f) of section 203, the basis shall be the same as in the case of
the property exchanged, decreased in the amount of any money received by
the taxpayer and increased in the amount of gain or decreased in the
amount of loss to the taxpayer that was recognized upon such exchange
under the law applicable to the year in which the exchange was made. If the
property so acquired consisted in part of the type of property permitted by
paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4) of subdivision (b) of section 203 to be received
without the recognition of gain or loss, and in part of other property, the
basis provided in this paragraph shall be allocated between the properties
(other than money) received, and for the purpose of the allocation there
shall be assigned to such other property an amount equivalent to its fair
market value at the date of the exchange. This paragraph shall not apply to
property acquired by a corporation by the issuance of its stock or securities
as the consideration in whole or in part for the transfer of the property to it;
Revenue Act of 1924, § 204(a)(6), 43 Stat. 253, 258-59 (1924).
71. Section 204(a)(8) provides in relevant part:
If the property (other than stock or securities in a corporation a party to
a reorganization) was acquired after December 31, 1920, by a corporation
by the issuance of its stock or securities in connection with a transaction
described in paragraph (4) of subdivision (b) of section 203 (including, also,
cases where part of the consideration for the transfer of such property to the
corporation was property or money in addition to such stock or securities),
then the basis shall be the same as it would be in the hands of the transferor,
increased in the amount of gain or decreased in the amount of loss recog-
nized to the transferor upon such transfer under the law applicable to the
year in which the transfer was made;
Revenue Act of 1924, § 204(a)(8), 43 Stat. 253, 259 (1924).
72. Revenue Act of 1924, § 204 (a)(6), 43 Stat. 253, 259, H.R. REP. No. 2, 70th
Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12 (1927).
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203(i) to section 112(j). The transferor substituted basis provi-
sion was changed from section 204(a)(6) to section 113(a)(6)
and the transferee corporation carryover basis provision was
renumbered from section 204(a)(8) to section 113(a)(8).
Very minor changes were made as part of the Revenue Act
of 1932 to reflect a corporate basis in the case of a contribution
of capital. 73 The Revenue Act of 1936 redesignated and
slightly redefined the 80% control test.7 " The adoption of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939 brought no changes to these
provisions. The Revenue Act of 1939, however, brought the
first explicit provisions regarding the treatment of debt and
hence may be regarded as the genesis of the current section
357.
In United States v. Hendler,75 the Supreme Court held that
when an acquiring company assumed and paid liabilities of the
target company in an otherwise tax-free reorganization, the
target company must treat the event as the equivalent of the
receipt of money. The transfer was therefore taxable as boot.
The Revenue Act of 1939 changed this result by adding sec-
tion 112(k).76 This section provided that such liability assump-
73. Revised § 113(a)(8) provided in relevant part:
If the property was acquired after December 31, 1920, by a corpora-
tion-
(A) by the issuance of its stock or securities in connection with a trans-
action described in section 112(b)(5) (including, also, cases where part of
the consideration for the transfer of such property to the corporation was
property or money, in addition to such stock or securities), or
(B) as paid-in surplus or as a contribution to capital, then the basis shall
be the same as it would be in the hands of the transferor, increased in the
amount of gain or decreased in the amount of loss recognized to the trans-
feror upon such transfer under the law applicable to the year in which the
transfer was made.
Revenue Act of 1932, § 113(a)(8), 45 Stat. 169, 200 (1932).
74. Section 112(h) provides in relevant part:
As used in this section the term "control" means the ownership of stock
possessing at least 80 per centum of the total combined voting power of all
classes of stock entitled to vote and at least 80 per centum of the total
number of shares of all other classes of stock of the corporation.
Revenue Act of 1936, § 112(h), 49 Stat. 1648, 1681 (1936).
75. United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564 (1938).
76. Section 112(k) provided in relevant part:
Where upon an exchange the taxpayer receives as part of the considera-
tion property which would be permitted by subsection (b)(4) or (5) of this
section to be received without the recognition of gain if it were the sole
consideration, and as part of the consideration another party to the ex-
change assumes a liability of the taxpayer or acquires from the taxpayer
property subject to a liability, such assumption or acquisition shall not be
considered as 'other property or money' received by the taxpayer within the
meaning of subsection (c), (d), or (e) of this section and shall not prevent
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tions were not to be treated as the receipt of money (absent a
tax avoidance purpose) for purposes of gain recognition.
However, section 1 13(a)(6)77 was also amended to provide that
such an assumption was treated as the receipt of money for
purposes of reducing basis in the stock or securities received.
In addition, section 112(b)(5) was amended to provide for the
impact of such debt assumptions on the proportionality test of
the statute. 78
the exchange from being within the provisions of subsection (b)(4) or (5);
except that if, taking into consideration the nature of the liability and the
circumstances in the light of which the arrangement for the assumption or
acquisition was made, it appears that the principal purpose of the taxpayer
with respect to the assumption or acquisition was a purpose to avoid Federal
income tax on the exchange, or, if not such purpose, was not a bona fide
business purpose, such assumption or acquisition (in the amount of the lia-
bility) shall, for the purposes of this section, be considered as money re-
ceived by the taxpayer upon the exchange. In any suit or proceeding where
the burden is on the taxpayer to prove that such assumption or acquisition is
not to be considered as money received by the taxpayer, such burden shall
not be considered as sustained unless the taxpayer sustains such burden by
the clear preponderance of the evidence.
Revenue Act of 1939, § 213, 53 Stat. 863, 870 (1939).
77. Section 113(a)(6) provided in relevant part:
If the property was acquired, after February 28, 1913, upon an ex-
change described in section 112(b) to (e), inclusive, the basis (except as pro-
vided in paragraphs (15), (17), or (18) of this subsection) shall be the same
as in the case of the property exchanged, decreased in the amount of any
money received by the taxpayer and increased in the amount of gain or de-
creased in the amount of loss to the taxpayer that was recognized upon such
exchange under the law applicable to the year in which the exchange was
made. If the property so acquired consisted in part of the type of property
permitted by section 112(b) to be received without the recognition of gain
or loss, and in part of other property, the basis provided in this paragraph
shall be allocated between the properties (other than money) received, and
for the purpose of the allocation there shall be assigned to such other prop-
erty an amount equivalent to its fair market value at the date of the ex-
change. This paragraph shall not apply to property acquired by a
corporation by the issuance of its stock or securities as the consideration in
whole or in part for the transfer of the property to it. Where as part of the
consideration to the taxpayer another party to the exchange assumed a lia-
bility of the taxpayer or acquired from the taxpayer property subject to a
liability, such assumption or acquisition (in the amount of the liability) shall,
for the purposes of this paragraph, be considered as money received by the
taxpayer upon the exchange.
Revenue Act of 1939, § 213(d), 53 Stat. 40, 871 (1939).
78. Section 112(b)(5) provided in relevant part:
No gain or loss shall be recognized if property is transferred to a corpo-
ration by one or more persons solely in exchange for stock or securities in
such corporation, and immediately after the exchange such person or per-
sons are in control of the corporation; but in the case of an exchange by two
or more persons this paragraph shall apply only if the amount of the stock
and securities received by each is substantially in proportion to his interest
in the property prior to the exchange. Where the transferee assumes a lia-
bility of a transferor, or where the property of a transferor is transferred
subject to a liability, then for the purpose only of determining whether the
[Vol. 16
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There were virtually no changes in these provisions until the
enactment of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. At that
time, sections 112(b)(5) and (c)(1) were renumbered as sec-
tions 351(a) and (b), respectively. Section 112(k) was renum-
bered and amended as section 357. Section 113(a)(6) became
sections 358 and 1031, and section 113(a)(8) became section
362.
There were two major changes to the incorporation scheme
in 1954. First, the House deleted the proportionality test of
old section 112(b)(5), because it was causing confusion and
uncertainty in practice. 79 The Senate agreed.80 Second, sec-
tion 112(k), treating the impact of liability assumptions, was
amended by keeping the provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1939 and by adding a new subsection. New section
357(c) was added and provided for the first time that if the
amount of liabilities assumed by the corporation or the amount
of the liabilities to which the transferred assets were subject
exceeded the basis of the assets transferred, gain was to be rec-
ognized to the extent of the excess.
The precise reason for this amendment is less clear,
although the House Report contains the following passage:
"[y]our committee's bill contains additional safeguards against
tax avoidance not found in existing law. It imposes a tax when
property subject to liability in excess of its basis is transferred
to a controlled corporation.""' In the House Report's detailed
discussion of the technical provisions of the bill, the following
explanation for section 357(c) 82 is stated:
Paragraph (2) of section 356 which has no counterpart
under the 1939 Code, provides that if an exchange to which
section 351 (relating to transfers to a controlled corpora-
tion) or section 359(d) (relating to corporate separations) is
amount of stock or securities received by each of the transferrers is in the
proportion required by this paragraph, the amount of such liability (if under
subsection (k) it is not to be considered as "other property or money") shall
be considered as stock or securities received by such transferor.
Revenue Act of 1939, § 213(c), 53 Stat. 37, 870 (1939).
79. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4025, 4064.
80. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4629, 4681.
81. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 39, 40 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4025, 4066 (1954).
82. Although the quoted text refers to § 356, the liability provision was renum-
bered as § 357 under the Senate's version of the bill.
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applicable, the liabilities are assumed, or the liabilities to
which the property is subject, exceed the total of the ad-
justed basis of the property transferred pursuant to such ex-
change, such excess shall be considered as gain from the
sale or exchange of a capital asset. Thus, if an individual
transfers, under section 351, property having a basis in his
hands of $20,000 but subject to a mortgage of $50,000, to a
corporation controlled by him, such individual will be sub-
ject to tax at rates applicable to the sale of capital assets
with respect to $30,000, the excess of the amount of the
liability over the adjusted basis of the property in the hands
of the transferor.83
It seems reasonably clear from the language included in the
first quotation that the original House bill contemplated that
the new section 357(c) was necessary to correct tax avoidance.
But what tax avoidance? The 20/50/30 example adopted by
both the House and Senate illustrates the operation of the
mechanics of the statute but not what would happen if section
357(c) were not enacted-in other words, the perceived abuse
at which the provision was aimed.
A glimpse at the perceived evil may be found by exploring
the interaction between the stock basis rules of the transferor
under section 358 and the liability assumption rules of section
357. Assuming no tax avoidance purpose and no section
357(c) provision, the $50,000 liability in the above example
would not be treated as the receipt of money for purposes of
gain recognition under section 357(a). But under section
358(d) the assumption would nevertheless reduce the trans-
feror's substituted basis of $20,000 in the stock to be received.
Thus, the transferor would have a negative basis of $30,000 in
the stock, which would provide a minimum gain on the disposi-
tion of the stock of $30,000.84 Of course, to the extent the fair
market value of the property increases, the amount of the sub-
sequent gain would increase. In the example cited by the
83. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 39, A129 (1954), reprinted in U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 4025, 4267 (1954). Some of this language, including the
example, was repeated in the Senate's detailed discussion of the technical provisions
of the bill. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 50, 270 (1954), reprinted in U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4629, 4908 (1954).
84. It is difficult to know the exact consequences of whether § 1014 would elimi-
nate this income potential at death. Presumably it would because it is unlikely that
the negative basis amount would be considered income in respect of a decedent
under §§ 691 and 1014. A transferee, therefore, would take a stepped-up basis to
fair market value.
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House and Senate Reports, the value of the property is not
stated. If it was $50,000, the amount of the liability, the trans-
feror would realize the same $30,000 gain on the disposition of
the stock as would have been realized if the asset had been sold
as opposed to transferred to the corporation. Similarly, if the
value is greater than the mortgage, this additional gain will
also be preserved. So what is the problem with negative basis?
Apparently, at the time section 357(c) was enacted there was
some doubt about whether a negative basis was permissible or
possible in our tax system. Absent a permissible negative ba-
sis, if the section 357(c) gain was not taxed at the time of the
transfer, the transferor would permanently escape tax on the
amount by which the liabilities exceeded basis. The section
357(c) solution to this problem is to tax the liability excess as
gain at the time of the transfer and give the transferor a zero
basis under section 358.
In introducing H.R. 8300, Dan Reed, then chairman of the
House Ways and Means Committee, indicated that one of the
purposes of the bill was to close numerous tax avoidance loop-
holes. Rather than detailing these, he entered into the record
a list of over fifty of such loopholes of which the section 357(c)
version was number twenty-one.8 5 Reed's commentary pro-
vided, in part, as follows:
Twenty-first. Assumption of liability in excess of basis, sec-
tion 356: If an individual transfers property with a basis of
$200,000 subject to a mortgage of $100,000 to a corpora-
tion controlled by him in exchange for its stock, the stock
will have a basis in his hands of $200,000 less the amount of
the mortgage: that is $100,000. This is so because the indi-
vidual has been relieved of paying the mortgage. However,
if the individual had borrowed $500,000 against the prop-
erty, it is doubtful whether, under existing law, the basis can
be reduced to less than zero for the stock. In other words,
under existing law he can escape completely from any tax
liability for the $300,000 by which the amount of the liabil-
ity exceeds his basis for the property in the example given
above.
The new code closes this loophole by levying a tax on the
amount by which the liability assumed exceeds the basis of
the property when property is transferred to a controlled
85. 100 CONG. REC. H3427 (1954).
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corporation .86
3. Limitations of the Statutory Negative Basis Approach
Fundamentally, the same circular analysis first exhibited in
Easson is troublesome in addressing the array of planning solu-
tions to a taxpayer facing a section 357(c) transfer. In short,
immediate recognition of gain is not the only solution to the
problem where the taxpayer adds assumed value to the assets
transferred to the corporation by giving a note, guaranteeing
liabilities and even pledging assets to secure a guarantee. This
happens to be the choice of section 357(c), but not a necessary
result, where these additional value added components are
present in the exchange. Moreover, consistent with the legisla-
tive history of section 357(c), negative basis need not be cre-
ated in the transaction if the value added transfers are
evaluated in consistent terms with other judicial doctrines re-
garding the treatment of debt in connection with the acquisi-
tion of property.
In considering the matter exclusively from the plain lan-
guage of section 357(c) one not only suffers from tunnel vision
but may miss the point of other more searching solutions
which do not result in a negative basis. In the case of a note
transfer, exemplified by Lessinger II, this may simply entail
granting the taxpayer a basis in the stock consistent with the
principles discussed below in Crane and Tufts. This is not to be
confused with the analysis of granting the taxpayer a basis in
her own note, although this statement more or less begs the
question.8 7 Granting a taxpayer a basis in property acquired
with debt necessarily assumes that the debt will be repaid in
the future with after-tax dollars, creating a basis at that time.
The immediate grant of basis in the property for the debt sim-
ply reflects an accelerated basis grant on the assumption that
the debt will actually be paid in the future. The Crane and Tufts
decisions have firmly imbedded this concept in tax law. If it is
imbedded in taxable transactions, it is imbedded in nontaxable
exchanges.88
86. Id.
87. This analysis runs contrary to the analysis presented in Rev. Rul. 68-629,
1968-2 C.B. 154, Alderman v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 662 (1971), and Smith v. Com-
missioner, 84 T.C. 889 (1985).
88. The taxpayer in Crane did not acquire the property in a taxable transaction
albeit it was not a carryover basis transaction. The taxpayer inherited the property
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The approach might necessarily be somewhat different with
property transferred where the taxpayer remains liable on the
debt because of the financial weakness of the corporate trans-
feree. Yet this alone does not suggest that the approach of
section 357(c) is superior to others or that another more satis-
factory approach cannot be crafted without creating a negative
basis. One idea would be to analyze the shareholder guaran-
tees. If in fact the lending institution required a guarantee as a
prerequisite to allowing the asset transfer, an assumption
could be made that the debt will actually be paid by the share-
holder and not the corporation. 89 If such an assumption were
allowed, the taxpayer would simply create additional basis af-
ter the exchange which would not be of benefit at the time of
the exchange by virtue of section 357(c).
To avoid this nasty and somewhat draconian result, another
idea would be to treat the guarantees the same as if the share-
holder had given a new note.90 If the corporation, as opposed
to the taxpayer, ultimately pays the debt, the taxpayer would
have income at that time. Moreover, an extension of the stat-
ute of limitations might even be extracted as part of the
bargain.
III. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF "TRUE ACQUISITION DEBT"
A. Crane v. Commissioner
In Crane v. Commissioner,9' Beulah Crane inherited an apart-
ment building in 1932 as the sole beneficiary of her husband's
will. The building was appraised for estate tax purposes at a
value exactly equal to the amount of its secured indebtedness;
a nonrecourse obligation.92 Mrs. Crane therefore inherited
the property with no realizable equity and subject to an inter-
from an estate receiving a § 1014 stepped-up basis. Depreciation was nonetheless
taken on the value of the property including the mortgage not net of the mortgage.
89. This argument is at odds with the current interpretation of § 357(c). See, e.g.,
Rosen v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 11 (1974), aff'd, 515 F.2d 507 (3d Cir. 1975). Con-
tra Jackson v. Commissioner, 708 F.2d 1402 (9th Cir. 1983).
90. Another obvious reason for not distinguishing between these two kinds of
continuing shareholder liabilities is that even where the taxpayer has guaranteed
such liabilities he could simply execute new notes to make the guarantees like the
notes in form as well as in substance.
91. 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
92. In this context, the term nonrecourse means the exclusive remedy of the
lender on default is to foreclose on the collateral (apartment building) securing the
loan. The lender could not pursue Mrs. Crane either personally or through any of
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est default. 93 The lending institution allowed Mrs. Crane to
continue to operate the property notwithstanding the default
provided she pay all operating expenses, hold back a monthly
amount for the payment of the real estate taxes, and pay the
balance of the net rentals over to the bank on a monthly basis.
She was entitled as the tax owner of the property to take de-
preciation deductions. After seven years of operation under
this arrangement, the interest default had doubled94 and the
taxpayer sold the property under a threat of foreclosure for
$3,000 cash, subject to the nonrecourse mortgage, but less
$500 in closing expenses.
The taxpayer claimed that the gain from the sale was only
$2,500, the amount of cash received less the expenses of sale.
Crane, however, took $28,045.10 in depreciation deductions
as a result of an inclusion of the mortgage in the original de-
preciable basis of the property. 95 The government contended
that her gain from the sale was actually $23,767.03.96 The dif-
ference in positions was attributable to the government's inclu-
sion of the mortgage's outstanding principal balance in the
amount realized.
The central issue was the Court's treatment of the amount of
the nonrecourse liability on the taxpayer's original depreciable
basis. The government argued that acquisition indebtedness
97
must be included in original basis for three reasons. 98 First, if
her other assets for a deficiency judgment, to the extent the nonrecourse collateral
was insufficient to pay the indebtedness.
93. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 3 (1947). The building was subject to a
mortgage of $255,000 with unpaid and accrued interest in default of $7,042.50 and
the property was included in the husband's estate at a value of the sum of the two or
$262,042.50. Id.
94. Id. The amount of interest default at the time of sale was $15,857.71.
95. The statutory definition of "amount realized" under § 1001(b) is the sum of
the amount of money received plus the fair market value of any other property re-
ceived. As discussed, Crane and Tufts add a third element to the statute, the face
amount of any debt on the property regardless of whether the amount of such debt
exceeds the fair market value of the property.
96. This amount was calculated by subtracting from the taxpayer's original basis
of $262,042.50 the depreciation allowed of $28,045.10 and comparing that amount
to the $2,500 net proceeds of sale, along with the principal amount of the mortgage.
The government did not treat the deducted and defaulted interest as part of the sale
proceeds.
97. The term "acquisition indebtedness" means any indebtedness which is in-
curred in acquiring, constructing or substantially improving any qualified residence
of the taxpayer .... I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B)(i)(I) (West Supp. 1989).
98. Id. at 1052-53.
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the depreciation deductions, ostensibly representing fictional
economic decline in value of the property, were based only
upon the taxpayer's equity99 in the property as opposed to its
gross fair market value including the amount of any mortgage,
the actual depreciation deductions would not bear any resem-
blance to the economic events affecting the property. Second,
if the debt were not included in the original basis of the prop-
erty, each payment of nondeductible principal on the loan
would require an adjustment to the taxpayer's basis. This is
because the taxpayer's after-tax investment in the property
would then increase. The government argued that this would
create intolerable administrative burdens on the government
as well as taxpayers. Finally, the government argued that if the
debt was not included in the taxpayer's original basis, the tax-
payer could manipulate and control the timing of depreciation
deductions by simply controlling the timing of principal
payments.
The taxpayer's principle argument was that the depreciation
deduction belonged to the person who had the risk of loss with
regard to the property. In this case, the lender. The Court
agreed with the government. 00
The Court concluded that the taxpayer must also include the
amount of the mortgage in the "amount realized" on the dis-
position of the property in order to avoid the absurd result of
creating a tax loss or deduction without a concomitant true
economic loss. The taxpayer was thus only entitled to deduct
the equity investment (zero) and any other uneconomic deduc-
tions were required to be included in income at the time of the
sale.' 0' This may be considered the informal birth of the con-
cept of "minimum gain."1
0 2
99. In this sense, equity is used to refer to the amount the taxpayer would be
entitled to receive on the sale of her property if sold for its fair market value, less the
face amount of any debt on the property.
100. Id. at 1053.
101. Id. at 1054-55. Curiously, the tax benefit from the interest deductions was
excluded from the government's analysis.
102. In partnership tax law, the concept of minimum gain is the amount of deduc-
tions taken with respect to a nonrecourse mortgage that result in deferral of income.
This is because on the disposition of the property, any deductions attributable to the
debt will have to be repaid in the form of gain under the Court's holding in Crane.
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B. Commissioner v. Tufts
In Tufts,'oS the Court revisited Crane to resolve the contro-
versy of whether the amount of a nonrecourse mortgage is still
included in the taxpayer's "amount realized" on the disposi-
tion of the property, where the amount of the mortgage ex-
ceeded the property's fair market value because of a post-
acquisition decline in the property's value. 10 4 The Court con-
cluded that there was no difference created by this factual
point and, consistent with Crane, the "amount realized" on the
disposition of the property included the face amount of the
mortgage. 105
The Tufts Court questioned why acquisition debt is included
in original basis. In addition to affirming the Crane rationale,
the Tufts Court added that the justification for granting an ac-
celerated basis for debt is that the loan is treated as true
debt. ' 0
6
A true loan is not included in income on receipt because of a
concomitant and offsetting obligation to repay. This repay-
ment obligation is also the foundation for including the loan in
the original basis.' 0 7 To avoid objections offered by the gov-
ernment in Crane for not including the loan in the original ba-
sis, Tufts concluded that all such debt, even nonrecourse debt,
must be included in the basis of the property acquired. 10 8
C. Application To Section 351 Transactions
What exactly is the impact of Crane and Tufts on section 351
transactions? What is the effect on the shareholder's stock ba-
sis of a continuing economic responsibility for liabilities which
appear to have been "transferred" to the corporation? What is
the impact of these cases on the shareholder's presumed eco-
nomic gain under section 357(c), particularly since the liabili-
ties in Crane and Tufts are nonrecourse?
The issue, of course, is whether there is a meaningful differ-
ence between the acquisition of stock in a section 351 incorpo-
103. 461 U.S. 300 (1983).
104. This question was created by the Crane Court's now famous footnote thirty-
seven. The Court implied that if the value of the property was below the amount of
the mortgage it might have reached a different result. 331 U.S. 1, 14 n.37 (1947).
105. 461 U.S. at 317.
106. Id. at 307.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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ration transfer and property acquired in a manner
contemplated in Crane and Tufts. The most obvious difference
is the nature of the transactions and how the taxpayer's basis is
determined in each.
In Crane, the property was acquired through an estate. The
taxpayer's basis was determined under section 1014 and was
equal to the fair market value at the date of the decedent's
death. In Tufts, the property was acquired in a taxable transac-
tion. The basis of the property was determined under the cost
basis approach of section 1012. In Lessinger and Owen, as de-
scribed below, the property was acquired in a section 351 ex-
change. The basis of the stock, therefore, was determined
under section 358. The argument asserted here is that there is
no economic or tax policy reason to treat debt differently in
these transactions, particularly new debt created as part of a
transfer to obtain corporate stock.
IV. LESSINGER CASE HISTORY
A. Lessinger I
In Lessinger I, Sol Lessinger transferred to a corporation the
majority of the assets and liabilities of an ongoing business.
This business had been operated for many years as a sole
proprietorship.10 9
At the time of the transfer, the proprietorship's books
showed that the business liabilities exceeded the aggregate ba-
sis of its assets transferred by $255,499.37. After the incorpo-
ration, the corporation's books showed a loan receivable from
Mr. Lessinger in the precise amount of the liabilities in excess
of basis or $255,499.37. The tax court found that Mr. Les-
singer "did not execute a note for this amount nor did he pay
or agree to pay interest on this amount."' "10
Within one month of the transfers, Mr. Lessinger applied a
portion of the proceeds from the sale of some personal mutual
funds to pay down the corporate note. The payment was
$62,209.35 and reduced the corporation's loan receivable to a
balance of $196,790. No additional payments were made for
approximately five years at which time the balance on the cor-
poration's receivable was $237,044. The increased balance re-
109. 85 T.C. 824 (1985).
110. Id. at 829.
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flected accrued interest. Approximately four years after
incorporation, a creditor forced Mr. Lessinger to execute a
note on behalf of the corporation." 1
Before the tax court, Lessinger's only argument concerning
section 357(c) was that the corporation did not "assume" all
the liabilities, particularly the trade accounts payable in the
amount of $416,026.24. The argument was that since Les-
singer had retained personal responsibility for these liabilities,
the corporation had merely made a loan to Lessinger to pay
the accounts payable.112
Although the tax court recognized that the question of
whether the corporation actually assumed the liabilities was a
matter of state law, in this case the corporation actually paid
the liabilities. The tax court determined that the record clearly
showed that Lessinger intended the corporation to pay the lia-
bilities in the normal course of its business."l 3 The court con-
cluded that in such circumstances, a debt could be considered
a section 357(c) liability even though Lessinger retained per-
sonal responsibility for its payment. The court based its deci-
sion on Smith v. Commissioner, and Rosen v. Commissioner. 114
Finally, the tax court rejected the contention that a properly
executed note would have made any difference. Citing Alder-
man v. Commissioner, the court held that such a note would have
had a zero basis and therefore would not balance the excess
liabilities for purposes of section 357(c).
115
B. Lessinger 11116
On appeal, Lessinger argued that the tax court had erred in
two ways. 1 7 First, the court erred in determining that the cor-
poration had "assumed" the accounts payable. Second, Les-
singer argued that the court misunderstood which assets were
11. Id.
112. Id. at 836.
113. Id. at 837.
114. Id. Smith v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 889, 909 (1985); Rosen v. Commis-
sioner, 62 T.C. 11, 19 (1974), aff'd, 515 F.2d 507 (3d. Cir. 1975). On this point, the
tax court also cited Jackson v. Commissioner, 708 F.2d 1402 (9th Cir. 1983), as re-
flective of a circumstance in which the corporation was not deemed to have assumed
the liability.
115. Lessinger v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 824, 837 (1985). See Alderman v. Com-
missioner, 55 T.C. 662, 665 (1971).
116. Lessinger v. Commissioner, 872 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1989).
117. Id. at 520.
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transferred to the corporation. Lessinger argued that the
court ignored his personal debt to the corporation. He rea-
soned that this debt should be considered a transferred asset
under section 357(c).
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals summarily rejected the
taxpayer's first argument that the liabilities had not been as-
sumed by the corporation. The court then proceeded to the
second question of whether the "note" transferred to the cor-
poration was an asset with basis equal to its face value for pur-
poses of section 357(c). 1 18
The court first concluded that the debt was not artificial. A
due date, interest, and security were not necessary to charac-
terize Lessinger's debt to his corporation as real debt. The
court found the debt enforceable because it was evidenced by a
note executed subsequent to incorporation." 19
The court then considered whether Lessinger had a basis in
the note sufficient to be counted in the section 357(c) equa-
tion. The court indicated that it thought that basis existed in
assets and not liabilities thus rejecting the notion that Les-
singer had a "basis" in the note sufficient to offset the excess
liabilities under section 357(c). The court reasoned that
"[s]ection 357(c) does support the Alderman court's reliance on
the concept of basis, but the statutory language is not ad-
dressed to a transaction such as Lessinger's, where the trans-
feror's obligation has value to the transferee corporation."' 120
The court then found section 357(c) inapplicable on two
new grounds not addressed by Lessinger at the tax court level.
First, the court fashioned a completely new and dubious inter-
pretation of the section 357(c)(1) "adjusted basis" concept.
The court reasoned that even though Lessinger had no section
1012 basis in his note liability because basis exists in assets not
liabilities,12' he nevertheless could not and did not transfer lia-
bilities in excess of basis under section 357(c)(1) because the
corporation had a basis in the liability. The court erroneously
reasoned that the corporation must have a basis in the share-
holder liability otherwise it would recognize income when Les-
singer paid the note. Moreover, since the corporation had a
118. Id. at 523.
119. Id. at 524.
120. Id. at 525.
121. Id.
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basis in the note, and since section 362(a) (governing corpo-
rate asset basis) provides that the corporation "acquires" its
basis from the shareholder, Lessinger must have had a section
357(c) inferred basis in the note exclusively for purposes of
section 357(c). 122
The court's second rationale examined the legislative history
of section 357(c)(1) and concluded that the purpose of section
357(c) was to tax the shareholder on the "economic benefit"
realized by the corporation's payment of liabilities which ex-
ceeded basis. 123 Using a common sense approach, the court
simply believed it counter-intuitive to pretend that Lessinger
received any net value from the corporation since he had an
offsetting, equal obligation to the corporation.
The government argued that the court's interpretation
would effectively eliminate section 357(c). But the court con-
cluded that its interpretation simply limited section 357(c) to
its intended and proper scope. 124
1. Analysis
Convinced of the equitable force of the taxpayer's position
in its second analysis, the court may well have attempted to
craft a solution to the basis "problem" the argument creates.
It seems reasonably clear that since one of the central purposes
of section 357(c) may have been to eradicate negative basis,
any solution proposed by the court to the taxpayer's circum-
stance must not create a negative basis in the taxpayer's stock.
The court's inventive, albeit inaccurate, section 362(a) trans-
ferred basis approach may simply be viewed as the best idea
they were presented with. There are other ideas which may be
better.
First, there does not seem to be any statutory prohibition
against an interpretation that suggests that if it is unreasonable
to assume or expect the corporation to pay the transferred lia-
bilities to any extent, the amount of liabilities need not be con-
sidered "transferred." This would be particularly true in the
case of a transfer "subject to" the liabilities as opposed to af-
firmatively "assumed" by the corporation. If this were the
case, that amount of liabilities would not be considered trans-
122. Id. at 525-26.
123. Id. at 526.
124. Id. at 526-28.
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ferred for purposes of sections 357 and 358. Since this idea
has not been widely accepted because of the apparent simplic-
ity of the "subject to" language of section 357(c),125 another
more creative solution may be necessary.
If the taxpayer's newly created liability is simply viewed as an
additional cost of acquiring his stock, and it is arguably noth-
ing more, Crane and Tufts will create a basis in the stock. The
fact that section 358(a) does not refer to this kind of a basis
increase is not controlling. It certainly was not controlling in
Crane and Tufts. A review of section 1012 does not suggest that
a taxpayer should be granted basis for debt. Moreover, a re-
view of the amount realized language of section 1001(b) cer-
tainly does not refer to debt. The fact of the matter is that the
treatment of debt and its impact on basis has been left largely
to judicial development. Evolving concepts of liabilities under
section 357(c) have no immediate reason to expect a better
fate.
Critics of this reasoning for avoiding negative basis may ar-
gue that such an analysis spells disaster. What if the corpora-
tion rather than the shareholder ultimately pays the liabilities
or cancels the note? The answer seems clear and is again
found in Crane and Tufts. The taxpayer would have cancella-
tion of debt income at the time the economic benefit arose
which is the time of payment of the shareholder's note. 126 No
additional stock basis would be achieved since the shareholder
already received a full basis at the time of the exchange.' 2 7
It would also not be accurate to suggest that the Crane and
Tufts view of debt is only relevant in taxable acquisitions of
property. A simple review of the basis provisions of section
1031(d) for property received in a nontaxable like-kind ex-
change reveals that a taxpayer is given a basis increase for any
amount of net debt increase incurred as a result of the ex-
change of the properties.
125. See, e.g., Rosen v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 11 (1974), aff'd, 515 F.2d 507 (3d
Cir. 1975).
126. Diedrich v. Commissioner, 457 U.S. 191 (1982) and Estate of Weeden v.
Commissioner, 685 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1982).
127. In Tufts, Justice O'Conner argued in a concurring opinion that this was ex-
actly what was taking place, as opposed to treating the subsequently realized income
as artificially realized "gain" from the sale of the property. This argument would
have taxed the income in Tufts as ordinary income. 461 U.S. at 317-20 (O'Connor,
J., concurring).
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Finally, the government's argument that this interpretation
would effectively eliminate section 357(c) except for those
without proper tax planning is also without merit. First, the
government's position suggests that the operation and impact
of section 357(c) falls primarily on those who "want" the sec-
tion 3 5 7 (c) gain. This is simply not the case.
One must only read the tax court record of Lessinger I to un-
derstand that Lessinger did not desire a large section 357(c)
gain. This fact issue was proven by Lessinger at trial. More-
over, Lessinger had sophisticated counsel and tax advice re-
garding his incorporation. How many taxpayers don't? How
many bad section 357(c) transfers does the government settle
as opposed to try because of little taxpayer hope in the trial?
How many bad section 357(c) cases does the government sim-
ply never see because of the audit lottery? Finally, and worst
of all, how many bad section 357(c) cases are encouraged by
this ridiculous system to be cured by forging and backdating
documents? The Second Circuit decision, in its own way, ad-
dressed this concern.
The second response is the one officially given by the court.
If the shareholder received no economic benefit subject to tax-
ation under section 357(c), there is no benefit to tax because
there is no "income." In those circumstances, where the
shareholder does receive an economic benefit, the operation of
section 357(c) is clear; they would be taxed currently. Thus, in
cases like Woodsam Associates, Inc. v. Commissioner,1 28 the share-
128. Woodsam Assocs., Inc. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952). In
Woodsam, the taxpayer corporation argued that the basis of its property acquired in a
tax-free incorporation should be increased by the amount of gain its shareholder,
Mrs. Wood, should have recognized when she refinanced the property prior to the
incorporation transfer with a nonrecourse mortgage. The corporation argued that
the nonrecourse mortgage in excess of basis should have been taxed to the share-
holder at that time. Its carryover basis, therefore, would be increased in an amount
to eliminate its liabilities in excess of basis. The Second Circuit disagreed and af-
firmed the tax court ruling that such a borrowing did not constitute income or gain at
the time of the borrowing to Mrs. Wood. Id. at 359.
As a result of the court's holding, the corporation took a carryover basis thus
preserving the liability in excess of basis problem. Moreover, because of the basis
statutes then in existence under § 113(a)(8) of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code, Mrs.
Wood would have a negative basis in her stock of the corporation equal to the liabil-
ity in excess of basis at the time of the incorporation transfers.
With the passage of § 3 57(c), Mrs. Wood would be forced to recognize gain in
the amount of the liabilities in excess of basis. This would also increase the corpora-
tion's basis in the asset under § 358(a). Surprisingly, § 357(c) has a beneficial aspect:
the liabilities in excess of basis would be recognized twice if not for the forced recog-
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holder would now be taxed under section 357(c) unless a note
was given at the time of the incorporation transfer.
V. OWEN CASE HISTORY
A. Owen 1129
William Owen and Stephen McEachron were involved in
many business ventures. In 1977 they formed McO Invest-
ment ("McO"), an equal general partnership. McO was
formed to invest in real estate ventures. In 1980 they decided
to enter the seismic drilling operation business. After failing
to successfully purchase such a business, they decided to start
their own. '3
0
At first, they structured the business by purchasing equip-
ment through McO and causing Western Exploration, Inc.
("Western") to conduct the operations of the business.' 3'
Western was also equally owned by Owen and McEachron and
was a Minnesota corporation since January 1, 1980. The tax-
payers hoped that McO would give them the depreciation and
investment tax credits associated with the ownership of the
equipment, while Western would provide a measure of limited
liability.
Under this arrangement, McO entered several lease agree-
ments with Western to enable it to utilize the equipment in its
operation of the business. Between March 1980 and May
1981, McO acquired approximately $1,288,164 in equipment
including drilling rigs, water and other trucks, and other mis-
cellaneous equipment. 
32
McO financed the equipment acquisitions through loans
with a Minnesota bank ("the Bank"). The Bank took purchase
money security interests in all of McO's equipment. The total
amount of the Bank loan on May 26, 1981 was $1,008,634.1 33
In their individual capacities, Owen and McEachron pledged
a $100,000 certificate of deposit on the loan, in addition to the
nition at the time of the transfer. It would be recognized first to Mrs. Wood when she
disposed of her stock with a negative basis, and second to the corporation.
129. Owen v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 1480 (1987).
130. Id. at 1481.
131. Id. The taxpayers also equally owned another company, Western Compa-
nies, Inc. ("WCI"), a North Dakota corporation, in the business of providing consult-
ing services for the acquisition and disposition of businesses.
132. Id. at 1486 (Appendix A).
133. Id. at 1482 n. 1l.
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equipment. As general partners of McO, Owen and McEach-
ron were personally responsible for the Bank loan. In addition,
they each executed personal guarantees for the McO Bank
loan. 134
In 1981, Western began to experience financial difficulties
due to the faltering oil boom. Western soon began to experi-
ence cash flow problems and eventually, it was unable to ser-
vice its lease payment obligations to McO. This in turn caused
McO to experience difficulties in servicing the Bank loan which
then began to drain the personal resources of Owen and Mc-
Eachron, its general partners. 3 5 In addition to damaging the
financial condition of Western, the faltering oil boom nega-
tively affected the value of the drilling equipment, the primary
collateral for the Bank loan. This, in turn, adversely affected
the personal finances of Owen and McEachron.
Recognizing the downward economic spiral in which they
were trapped, Owen and McEachron decided to limit McO's
losses by selling the seismic oil drilling business. It was de-
cided that the sale of the business would be most easily accom-
plished if the assets were first transferred to Western and the
business was sold as a whole.13
6
The Tax Court found as a matter of fact that:
Petitioners realized, however, that McO's outstanding in-
debtedness exceeded McO's adjusted basis in the property.
In order to avoid a potential Federal income tax problem,
petitioners met with bank officials and discussed the possi-
bility of the bank reducing its security interest in the
equipment. 137
Owen and McEachron transferred substantially all the equip-
ment to Western on December 31, 1981 but there was no con-
temporaneous written documentation regarding the transfer.
On December 31, 1981, however, Western executed a "Third
Party Pledge Agreement" granting the Bank a security interest
in all the equipment transferred to Western.
On December 31, 1981, the aggregate unpaid balance on
the Bank loan was $988,008.48. McO's records reflected an
adjusted basis in the equipment of $781,862.23, although the
134. Id. at 1482.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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government's subsequent notice of deficiency determined an
adjusted basis of $763,354.23. Thus, McO's liabilities to which
the equipment was subject exceeded the adjusted bases of
those same assets by $224,654.25 immediately prior to the
transfer of the equipment to Western.
In April of 1982, the Internal Revenue Service began its in-
vestigation of this transaction, and on or about June 24, 1982,
the agent requested documentation regarding McO's Decem-
ber 31, 1981 transfer to Western. During June or July 1982,
approximately six months after the equipment transfer, coun-
sel prepared a "Transfer Agreement" which was dated "as of"
December 31, 1981. The Transfer Agreement provided that
Western agreed to pay and assume $781,862.23 of McO's debt
on the equipment and that Western agreed to indemnify McO
against all claims arising out of the agreement.
38
An "amendment" to the Transfer Agreement, also prepared
in June or July of 1982 and approximately six months after the
equipment transfer from McO to Western, provided that: (i)
the equipment transferred from McO to Western was " 'secur-
ity for certain purchase money indebtedness in an amount in
excess of the indebtedness assumed by Western . . .' "; and (ii)
Western would not " 'assume any of said indebtedness in ex-
cess of $781,862.23, it being expressly agreed by and between
the parties that any of said indebtedness in excess of the
amount assumed by Western shall be the sole obligation of
McO. . .' "139
The Transfer Agreement and Amendment were executed
during September 1982. On September 3, 1982, the Bank re-
leased part of the security interest in the equipment trans-
ferred to Western. The fair market value of the equipment on
December 31, 1981 was approximately $750,000. This valua-
tion was determined by the sale of McEachron's 50% interest
in Western to an unrelated purchaser on September 2, 1982.
Thus, the equipment was worth less than its basis of $763,
354.23 and much less than the Bank's loan of $988,008.48.
The tax court held that section 357(c) governed the transac-
tion and that McO, and therefore Owen and McEachron, real-
ized a taxable gain. In so holding, the court relied on Smith v.
Commissioner, Rosen v. Commissioner, and Lessinger v. Commis-
138. Id. at 1483.
139. Id.
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sioner.14 0 Lessinger was of course subsequently reversed by the
Second Circuit.
The court relied upon these cases for the proposition that an
assumption and release of liability of the shareholder was un-
necessary under section 357(c) since the statute contained pro-
visions including liabilities if the assets were "subject to" the
liabilities. Because McO transferred all of the assets subject to
the liabilities, the court found that all of the liabilities stated in
the security agreement were governed by section 357(c).
The taxpayers argued, nevertheless, that the transfer was not
effective because they had an oral agreement with the Bank to
release the security interest in the amount of the excess liabili-
ties. Considering the evidence as a whole, the tax court was
not persuaded that such an oral agreement existed. Accord-
ingly, the tax court found that: (i) the transferred equipment
was security for the entire amount of the liabilities; (ii) there
was no contrary oral agreement with the Bank existing on De-
cember 31, 1989; and (iii) the taxpayers' personal assumption
of a portion of the Western liabilities was irrelevant. The court
then held that the full amount of the liabilities were within sec-
tion 357(c). 1
4 '
In the last paragraph of the opinion, the tax court addressed
the impact of the $100,000 certificate of deposit.142 The certif-
icate was the personal property of Owen and McEachron and
was pledged as additional collateral on the Bank loan. Even
though the certificate remained the property of Owen and Mc-
Eachron after the equipment transfer to Western, the court re-
duced the amount of liabilities McO was deemed to have
transferred to Western by the amount of the certificate. The
court found that the Bank always considered the certificate as a
reduction in the total amount of outstanding liabilities."43
B. Owen II
In Owen H, 1 4 4 the taxpayer made several arguments regard-
140. Id. at 1485. Smith v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 889 (1985), aff'd, 805 F.2d 1073
(D.C. Cir. 1986), Rosen v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 11 (1974), aff'd, 515 F.2d 507 (3d
Cir. 1975) and Lessinger v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 824 (1985).
141. Owen v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 1480, 1485.
142. Id. at 1486.
143. Id. at 1487.
144. 881 F.2d 832 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 58 U.S.L.W. 3526 (U.S. Feb. 20,
1990).
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ing the section 35 7 (c) issue. The first was that since the tax-
payers had personally guaranteed the liabilities and remained
liable after the transfer, the liabilities should be excluded from
the application of section 357(c). Citing Smith and Rosen, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this argument since
those cases held section 357(c) applied even if the shareholder
remained personally liable on the debt. 145 Moreover, the court
noted that the issue of whether the assets were subject to the
liabilities was a question of fact for the tax court under the
holding in Beaver v. Commissioner.
146
The taxpayer nevertheless requested the Ninth Circuit to
overrule Smith, Rosen, and Beaver, and hold that section 357(c)
"only applies where a taxpayer realizes an economic benefit in
the transfer."' 47 The court rejected this argument since the
plain language of the statute did not make a special provision
for transfers not resulting in an economic benefit. 48 More-
over, the court noted that after Commissioner v. Tufts, the tax-
payer may realize a taxable gain under section 1001 even
without receiving an economic benefit. The court reasoned
that:
We decline the Owens' invitation because section 357(c)'s
plain language makes no special provision for transfers not
resulting in an economic benefit to the transferor. Cf. Com-
missioner v. Asphalt Products Co., 482 U.S. 117, 120-21
(1987)(per curiam)(courts must give effect to the plain lan-
guage of the internal revenue code); Commissioner v. Tufts,
461 U.S. 300, 307 (1983)(taxpayer may realize a taxable
gain under I.R.C. § 1001 even without receiving a net eco-
nomic benefit from the transferee).
149
The Ninth Circuit also rejected the taxpayer's argument that
its prior decision in Jackson v. Commissioner, required a different
result. Jackson involved a transfer of a joint venture partner-
ship interest to a controlled corporation in the year following
the partnership's deduction of losses. The Commissioner ar-
gued that the transfer should result in a taxable gain under
section 357(c).150 The Ninth Circuit held that since the trans-
145. Id. at 835.
146. Id. See also Beaver v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 52 (1980).
147. 881 F.2d at 835.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Jackson v. Commissioner, 708 F.2d 1402, 1405 (9th Cir. 1983).
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feree corporation had not assumed any of the taxpayer's part-
nership liabilities and the partnership interest itself was not
security for a loan, the partnership liabilities were not included
under section 357(c). 15 1
Thus, the court distinguished its own Jackson case by noting
that in Jackson the asset transferred to the corporation was a
partnership interest which itself was not subject to any security
interest. In this case the equipment was specifically subject to
liabilities recognized under section 357(c).152 Moreover, the
court believed that Jackson had been somewhat eroded by the
subsequent decision in Tufts. The court stated that:
Furthermore,Jackson was decided without the benefit of the
Supreme Court's opinion in Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S.
300, 307 (1983). Tufts and Jackson were published at ap-
proximately the same time. Relying in part on dicta from
Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947),Jackson concluded
that section 1001, and the tax system as a whole, require
that the transferor receive "economically significant consid-
eration."Jackson, 708 F.2d at 1404. Tufts clarified the scope
of Crane and rejected Crane's "limited theory of economic
benefit." Tufts, 461 U.S. at 307. Tufts undercuts the author-
ity supporting the Jackson decision. 153
1. Analysis
The Ninth Circuit's approach is both surprising and argua-
bly incorrect, at least with respect to its Tufts interpretation of
section 357(c). This interpretation considers that the receipt
of an economic benefit is no longer a prerequisite to taxation
of income generally. The legislative history of section 357(c)
does not support the court's rigid application of the literal lan-
guage of the statute to produce an unintended result. The leg-
islative history of section 357(c) indicates that it was designed
to prevent a shareholder from avoiding a tax on a gain clearly
related to the realization of an economic benefit: the transfer
of assets subject to liabilities in excess of basis with the corpo-
ration accepting future liability payment responsibility. The
statute was not intended to reach attenuated shareholder ben-
efit from a corporation accepting assets subject to liabilities
151. Id.
152. 881 F.2d at 835-36.
153. Id. at 836 (parallel citations omitted).
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which the corporation is incapable of paying, and does not in-
tend to pay in the future.
In addition, the court's analysis of the economic benefit doc-
trine, as expressed in Tufts, is misplaced. The realization of a
Crane-type economic benefit was rejected in Tufts only as a way
to explain the necessity of a system with a cohesive symmetry
regarding the treatment of acquisition debt. If all acquisition
debt is to be included in the section 357 and section 1012
"cost" basis of the property,1 54 then such debt must be in-
cluded in the amount realized on the disposition of the prop-
erty. This must be so regardless of whether the depreciation
deductions produced a prior economic or tax benefit. Simply
stated, Tufts established that Crane was not bottomed on an
economic benefit theory but rather on a theory that nonre-
course and recourse debt is treated as true debt with respect to
the determination of basis.' 55 The economic benefit doctrine
still plays an important role in taxation. The inclusion of both
recourse and nonrecourse debt in the amount realized on the
disposition of the property, however, does not depend upon a
correlative economic benefit from the inclusion of the debt in
basis. 156
VI. EcONoMIc RATIONALITY
The tension between Lessinger II and Owen II exists at two
levels. First, the language of section 357(c) creates a gain to
taxpayers like Messrs. Lessinger and Owen. Owen H adopts
this approach notwithstanding the inequitable result. Lessinger
H refuses to adopt this approach because it produces an ineq-
uitable result. The question then is which statutory construc-
tion approach is preferable and why?
If the Lessinger H statutory construction of section 357(c) is
preferred, it must carry the purpose and intent of the statute.
154. The inclusion of such acquisition debt is subject to the limitation that the
amount of nonrecourse debt which may be included in the original acquisition cost
basis is limited to the unencumbered fair market value of the property. See Estate of
Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976). This principle prevents
the overstatement of basis to produce the tax benefit of deferral.
155. Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 309-10 (1983).
156. Tufts also disclaimed any relationship between its decision and the tax benefit
rule. The Court indicated that there are clearly cases in which the inclusion of re-
course and nonrecourse debt in the original basis of a nondepreciable, nonwasting
asset such as stock will produce the same result. Id. at 308 n.5.
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As reviewed earlier, the legislative history seems clear enough:
at the time of the transfer of assets to a controlled corporation,
the taxpayer clearly realized economic gain in the form of lia-
bilities in excess of basis. This is done in order to prevent the
shareholder from permanently escaping tax on the gain
(presuming a negative basis in the stock received is not permis-
sible) when the corporation pays the liabilities.
In Lessinger H and Owen II, no such economic benefit or per-
manent tax avoidance is present. Accordingly, an unimagina-
tive reading of the technical language of section 357(c) is
unnecessary and is not consistent with the intent of the statute.
The only point of such an interpretation would be to force
Congress to deal with an artificial and unintended judicial re-
sult, a process occupying many Congressional moments.
At another level, Owen H's analysis of Tufts and its economic
benefit doctrine seems clearly wrong. Both Crane and Tufts in-
volved the realization of gain from the disposition of property
subject to nonrecourse debt in excess of the basis of the asset
transferred. The suggestion in this context is that economic
benefit is no longer a fundamental part of the income tax sys-
tem. This suggestion incorrectly fails to properly identify the
context of the Tufts statement and to differentiate between re-
course and nonrecourse liabilities. In the section above, the
context of the Tufts economic benefit statement was explored.
That analysis concludes that the economic benefit doctrine was
not eroded in Tufts. In fact, the doctrine was considered in the
narrow context of the inclusion of recourse and nonrecourse
acquisition debt in the amount realized at the moment of prop-
erty disposition. The parity argument is based upon similar
inclusions in the basis of the property of like debt, when it was
acquired. This argument, as Tufts concludes, has little if any-
thing to do with the economic benefit doctrine. But there is
another reason to reject Owen H's Tufts hypothesis. Owen II
simply failed to distinguish between recourse and nonrecourse
debt in this context.
Dispositions of property subject to nonrecourse debt must
force recognition of liability in excess of basis transferred at
the time of disposition. There is no other more appropriate
opportunity. The disposition is the taxpayer's final connection
to the property and the debt. This is simply not the case with
recourse liabilities. If the taxpayer's liability exposure survives
the transfer in the form of guarantees or in additional notes
[Vol. 16
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created in the transfer, future events may require the taxpayer
to make payments on the "transferred" liabilities.
It is at least more appropriate in this context to assess the
circumstances surrounding the transfer to determine if the tax-
payer or the corporation will pay the liabilities. Subdivision (c)
assumes the corporation will. When it cannot, particularly as
in Owen when the value of the assets had declined below the
basis of the assets, is this assumption realistic or reasonable?
In Owen I, the tax court took the first step in examining this
issue. Lessinger H took another step. In Owen I, the tax court
reduced the liabilities deemed "transferred" to the corpora-
tion by the $100,000 shareholder certificate of deposit pledged
on the bank loan. This treatment is an explicit recognition that
the corporation would not pay this portion of the liabilities,
notwithstanding the fact that the lender had a security interest
in all the assets transferred to the corporation. Thus, notwith-
standing the fact that the assets were transferred to the corpo-
ration "subject to" the full amount of the liabilities, in the form
of a bank security interest, the tax court recognized the eco-
nomic reality that the corporation would not pay $100,000 of
the liabilities.
But why not? Does the shareholder pledge of assets destroy
or negate the corporation's obligation or ability to pay the lia-
bilities? Of course not. Yet the tax court nevertheless held that
this amount of the liability was not "transferred" to the corpo-
ration. This aspect of Owen I was not appealed.
When recourse liabilities are involved, the shareholder has a
potential continuing liability even after the transfer. This is not
the case with nonrecourse liabilities. When the corporation
does not assume the liabilities and the lender does not release
the shareholder from liability after the transfer, the economic
likelihood of shareholder payment increases proportionately
to corporate financial instability. Under these circumstances it
more clearly comports with economic reality to treat the liabili-
ties as "retained" and not "transferred" notwithstanding that
the lender may have a security interest in all the assets trans-
ferred and held by the corporation. This is consistent with the
economic benefit doctrine and basis rules of Crane and Tufts.
Moreover, it does not create a negative basis under sections
357 and 358. If the corporation subsequently pays the liabili-
ties contrary to this assumption, the shareholder would have
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ordinary income from the discharge of indebtedness under
section 61(a)(12).1
57
VII. LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATION
Considering the extent of the conflict between Owen II in the
Ninth Circuit and Lessinger H in the Second Circuit, t 58 a ques-
tion remains as to what course to take to best restore predict-
ability to section 357(c) transactions, and to eliminate its
current trap for unsuspecting taxpayers and their counsel.
One approach would be to allow courts to continue to fashion
remedial efforts as each case arises.
This of course lacks the predictability associated with a pre-
scriptive statutory rule. Moreover, Congress and the Treasury
may be better equipped to fashion a broad based rule with ap-
propriate limitations and qualifications to assure compliance
with the intent of section 357(c). What characteristics should a
section 357(c) amendment possess?
Based on the analysis discussed herein, it would appear to be
appropriate to distinguish between recourse and nonrecourse
liabilities. A nonrecourse lender looks exclusively to its collat-
eral for repayment. If the collateral has been legally trans-
ferred to the corporation, there is no reason to expect or
anticipate that the shareholder will pay any portion of the lia-
bility after the transfer.
It is also reasonable to examine any affirmative corporate
acts recognizing its responsibility for and acceptance of a re-
payment responsibility. One such affirmance would be an ex-
press corporate assumption of the liability. Where the
157. See Estate of Weeden v. Commissioner, 685 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1982). In
Weeden, the court was faced with a determination of the timing of the realization of
the donor's economic benefit occasioned by the donee's payment of the donor's gift
tax liability in a "net gift." Weeden interpreted the issue left unanswered in Diedrich
v. Commissioner, 457 U.S. 191 (1982), and held that the economic benefit was not
realized by the donor until the donee actually paid the gift tax liability. Id. at
1161-62.
158. Under the tax court's rule expressed in Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.
742, 757 (1970), aff'd, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971),
taxpayers residing in the Second Circuit will be able to rely on Lessinger H in the tax
court while taxpayers residing elsewhere will be forced to accept the tax court's nor-
mative position as expressed in Owen I and Lessinger I. In addition, as expressed in
McEachron v. Commissioner, 873 F.2d 176 (8th Cir. 1988) and Rosen v. Commis-
sioner, 515 F.2d 507 (3d Cir. 1975), it is not at all clear that the conflict is limited to
the Second and Ninth Circuits and may well include the Third and the Eighth Cir-
cuits as well.
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corporation merely accepts the assets "subject to" the liabili-
ties in the form of a security interest, further inquiry is neces-
sary as expressed in Owen I. Such an inquiry is necessary to
determine if it is reasonable to assume that the corporation will
pay the liabilities.
In cases where the corporation takes the assets "subject to"
a recourse liability which is not specifically assumed by the cor-
poration, an examination of the corporation's financial ability
to pay the liabilities as they mature should be the focus of the
statute. The issue in such cases is whether it is reasonable to
assume the corporation, rather than the shareholder, will pay
the liabilities. Where the corporation has no operating history
(i.e. a new corporation), or where it has an operating history
suggesting that it is not reasonable to expect the corporation
to pay the liabilities in the future, it is more appropriate to as-
sume that the shareholder will pay the liability rather than the
corporation.
CONCLUSION
The parallels between the 1978 amendment process which
resulted in section 357(c)(3)159 excepting cash basis payables
from the definition of section 357(c) liabilities, and which ap-
plied the economic benefit doctrine to section 357(c), are com-
pelling. In both situations, the statutory language is simple,
clear, and produces a straightforward application of the statute
and a resulting tax liability. In both situations, the trial courts
(principally the tax court) have a consistent record of imposing
a tax under the literal language of the statute while at the same
time recognizing the harshness of their own interpretation. In
both situations, the Circuit Courts of Appeal ultimately fashion
inconsistent and often conflicting rationales and results to
ameliorate the circumstance.
This set of circumstances simultaneously presents the op-
portunity for both review by the United States Supreme Court,
and legislative amendment, as in 1978. Supreme Court review
would resolve the conflict in the Circuit Courts of Appeal.
Legislative amendment would serve to provide a more broad
based prescriptive rule. Practitioners would thereby be given
159. Payables are generally excepted from the definition of liabilities to prevent
unfairly biasing accounts payable over zero based accounts receivable.
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the practical guidance necessary to plan the wide range of
transactions arising in this field.
As it is now, most informed practitioners simply plan around
the problems presented by section 357(c). A variety of meth-
ods and techniques have evolved which include a transfer of
additional assets to the corporation which have additional basis
equal to or greater than the excess liabilities transferred.
Other techniques include holding back part of the liabilities to
be transferred to the corporation other than accounts
payable. 1
60
The Supreme Court did not review the previous section
357(c) judicial dispute prior to the 1978 statutory amendment.
Presumably this was because the Circuit Courts of Appeal were
not in serious conflict. The decisions were reasonably consis-
tent in their findings for the taxpayers even if their rationales
were somewhat inconsistent.
The Second Circuit Lessinger H and the Ninth Circuit Owen H
decisions are in a direct an unexplained conflict with respect to
the application of the economic benefit doctrine in section
357(c) transactions. On November 2, 1989, a Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari was filed to review this conflict. The Petition
was denied on February 20, 1990.
This unexplored conflict will make it difficult for the lower
courts to uniformly and consistently resolve disputes turning
on the interpretation of section 357(c) and the liabilities issues
discussed herein. In the tax court, taxpayers residing in the
Second Circuit would benefit from Lessinger II under the tax
court's rule expressed in Golsen v. Commissioner.16' Golsen is pre-
mised on efficiency. Even though the tax court considers itself
a national court, it will follow the law of the circuit in which the
taxpayer's case would be appealed, even if that precedent dif-
fers from the tax court's independent assessment of the mat-
ter. Pursuant to section 7482(b)(1)(A), the decisions of the tax
court are appealed to the circuit of the legal residence of the
individual taxpayer. 162
160. As noted, since 1978, zero based account payables are excluded from the
definition of liabilities. As a result, withholding such "liabilities" in a § 351 transfer
does not help to correct the § 357(c) imbalance since they are not counted in the
liability equation in the firsc instance.
161. 54 T.C. 742,757 (1970), aff'd, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 940 (1971).
162. I.R.C. § 7482(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1989).
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Under the Golsen rule, the tax court would follow the Second
Circuit's Lessinger H position in cases that could be appealed to
the Second Circuit. In cases that could be appealed to the
Ninth Circuit, the tax court would be expected to follow Owen
H. In cases appealable to circuits which have not yet ruled on
the matter, the tax court remains free to adopt either circuit's
view or some alternative of its own, although thus far its view
has been consistent with the view of the Commissioner and the
Ninth Circuit.
Other circuit conflicts are arguably involved. Lessinger H
conflicts not only with the Ninth Circuit's Owen H decision, but
also with the Eighth Circuit's position in McEachron v. Commis-
sioner.163 The brevity of that court's affirmance of the tax
court's consolidated case with Owen I makes it difficult to deter-
mine whether it also rejected the Second Circuit's interpreta-
tion of section 357(c) as requiring an economic benefit for
there to be a taxable "gain." Presumably, the Eighth Circuit
would follow the Ninth Circuit rationale; it reached the same
result as the Ninth Circuit in Owen H and it was briefed and
argued by the same counsel as Owen I and Owen H.
The conflict may include the Third Circuit which affirmed
without opinion a tax court decision consistent with the Ninth
Circuits's later decision in Owen H.164 Because the Ninth Cir-
cuit's Owen H decision does not analyze the Second Circuit's
Lessinger H decision, uncertainty continues in all tax forums be-
cause of the possibility that the result in Owen H might have
been different if Lessinger H had been considered. Court review
should be extended to provide clarity and certainty in this im-
portant field of business transactions. The Supreme Court's
resolution of the scope of section 357(c) will avoid certain and
continued future litigation in the tax court and the circuit
courts.
The resolution of these continuing conflicts is not the only
reason for the Supreme Court to consider the matter in a case
of subsequent conflict. The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of
the economic benefit doctrine as applicable to recourse liabili-
ties and hence its interpretation of Crane and Tufts is equally
troubling. Until the application of the economic benefit doc-
163. 873 F.2d 176 (8th Cir. 1988).
164. Rosen v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 11 (1974), af'd, 515 F.2d 507 (3d Cir.
1975).
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trine is distinguished and explained in the context of recourse
and nonrecourse liabilities, confusion and misinterpretation
will abound. Supreme Court review can resolve the mystery.
Finally, it is impossible to count on corrective legislation,
particularly in the current political environment driven as it is
by economic and budgetary concerns. Technical amendments
are not likely to be offered or supported by the government
until its section 357(c) position and the tax court interpretation
is firmly rejected by the Supreme Court. This is one of those
moments in the judicial history regarding the development and
interpretation of the tax law where the Supreme Court has the
opportunity to make tax practice more fair while making it
more simple. Hopefully, both the Court and Congress will re-
spond to the pressing need for clarification in this important
field of business practice. 165
165. For another view of the direct conflict between Lessinger and Owen, see
Bogdanski, Closely Held Corporations, Shareholder Debt, Corporate Debt: Lessons From Leavitt
and Lessinger, 16J. CORP. TAx'N 348, 364 (1990):
[t]he Ninth Circuit's sheepish change of heart [from Jackson to Owen] leaves
it in complete harmony with the Fourth Circuit in Estate of Leavitt... but the
new case [Owen] seems to be in hopeless conflict with Lessinger. If ever an
area was ripe for congressional or Supreme Court review, this is one.
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